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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

STATE SUBSIDY COMPOSITION IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
POLICY AND IMPACTS
Higher education is the third largest state expenditure behind K-12 and Medicaid but is
generally more discretionary than most other budget categories. As demographic trends
and economic downturns constrain state budgets, the delivery of state subsidies in higher
education has increasingly shifted toward students via grant aid and away from
institutions via appropriations. Since the 1990s, many states have changed the
composition of their state subsidies in higher education to varying degrees.
There is a rich literature that examines the effects of state subsidies on various aspects of
the higher education market. This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on two
broad fronts. First, rather than state subsidy levels, theoretical and empirical emphasis is
placed on subsidy composition, or the distribution of subsidies across three primary
modes of delivery—appropriations, need-based grants, and non-need-based grants. This
focus is meant to reflect the policy decision faced by states, especially during times of
fiscal stress, and reveal insights into important economic considerations. Second,
differential impacts of state subsidies are examined not only with respect to student
ability and income but also college inputs of academic quality and amenities. College
amenities are an important input in the higher education market in need of more
theoretical and empirical analysis.
The introduction briefly discusses the economic rationale for public subsidies in higher
education and the complexity confronting states to subsidize the cost of college under
various constraints and policy goals. Chapter 2 aims to orient the reader to the policy,
trends, and research pertaining to state subsidies in higher education. Chapter 3
theoretically examines the response in student demand for educational resources and
amenities to changes in state subsidy composition from which several policy implications
and directions for future research are considered. Chapter 4 focuses on subsequent effects
that changes in demand between educational resources and amenities may have on
institutions. State subsidies and institutional expenditures between 1990 and 2016 are
examined in order to determine whether the composition of state subsidies causes in-state
institutions to alter expenditures in a way that reflects a divergence between educational
and amenity inputs. Chapter 5 considers the role of college student migration with respect

to state subsidies and student outcomes. State subsidies impact college choice, and in
turn, alter the distance students migrate to attend college. The effect of distance on
college student success is theoretically and empirically examined. Chapter 6 concludes
with a summary and discussion of the main findings as well as ideas and directions for
future research.
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[1]
INTRODUCTION
PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Higher education in the U.S. garners a substantial public investment. The federal
government spent approximately $45 billion on higher education programs in 2014,
excluding loans, and forewent another $35 billion in related tax expenditures (Oliff,
Robyn, & Thiess, 2017). In addition, $1.3 trillion in student loan debt, almost all of
which is serviced by the federal government, costs about $5 billion to administer each
year and the CBO estimates $130 billion in losses on loans through 2026 (Cooper, 2016).
State and local governments spent $90.5 billion on higher education in 2016, most of
which is provided by states and represents the third largest spending category behind K12 education and Medicaid.
This work examines the policy and impacts of state higher education subsidies
across different modes of delivery. Before addressing such matters, let us first consider
why governments make such investments. Behind the ongoing debate concerning public
support for higher education lays two primary economic justifications for government to
subsidize the cost of college: insufficient capital markets and positive externalities.
Though policy might differ depending on which of the two government considers the
dominant issue, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the case can be made that
government intervention on the basis of insufficient capital markets is a narrower
approach that still implies the presence of positive externalities that, in turn, ultimately
explains the full assortment of public investment currently observed.
Attending college presents substantial upfront costs to an individual, while most
of its economic benefit accrues over his or her lifetime via higher wages. Loans are a
common financial product available to those wishing to purchase high-cost items with
long-run returns, such as a house or car. The discount rate and risk of default inherent in
all loans are accounted for in a loan’s interest rate and requirement to provide collateral,
such as the house or car just purchased, to be repossessed in the event of default.
However, most prospective college students do not have such collateral to offer, and
lenders have yet to devise a way to repossess a student’s education.
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The high risk of college loans translates to high interest rates in the private loan
market that would presumably cause a nontrivial portion of the population to forego or
delay college if not for public intervention. The federal government supplies an array of
loans with lower interest rates and more generous repayment terms than the private
market provides. For instance, in 2017-18 undergraduates were able to borrow at a rate of
4.45 percent through federal loans, while the average variable rate and fixed rate in the
private market was 7.81 and 9.66 percent, respectively (Dickler, 2017). Without federal
investment the private loan market would surely grow but not to comparable size nor
offer comparable rates. As a result, the costs of college would rise, and college
enrollment would decline.
Is fewer people going to college due to higher borrowing costs a negative
outcome? Without much more information such a question is not remotely answerable.
Whether public funds should be used to lower the cost of borrowing for college at all on
economic grounds can be answered somewhat more easily. It depends. If higher
education generates positive externalities, then a necessary condition has been met that
potentially warrants the use of public funds to lower the cost of college. If capital markets
are insufficient, then college loans are a promising area for public investment.
The chapters that follow are predicated on the presence of positive externalities in
higher education. In other words, attainment of a college credential produces benefits that
are not fully captured in the return received by the individual. In this respect, the higher
education market is economically inefficient. Too few credentials would be pursued
relative to what is socially optimal if left entirely to private market mechanisms. Standard
theory suggests government can correct this inefficiency via subsidies commensurate
with the value of the public benefit.
Additional options for public investment exist beyond college loans, namely
direct subsidies to students in the form of grant aid or institutions in the form of
appropriations. Again, provision of federal college loans on the basis of insufficient
capital markets is another option. Of course, spending public funds with no intent of
direct repayment, as is the case with grants and appropriations but not the case with
loans, implies a degree of public benefit that many may find dubious (Rosen & Gayer,
2010). The extent to which the public should support higher education is under constant
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debate and there is significant variation in that support at the federal and state levels over
time.
The question of whether and how much government should subsidize higher
education is not examined here. Instead, this work examines the effects of state subsidies
as they are or have changed over time. Still, the normative issues regarding public
subsidies in higher education provide important context to their effects. As policymakers
decide how to finance higher education each year, the normative debate serves as a
reminder there are potentially broad societal impacts with such decisions. This
intersection between the normative and positive economics of higher education is
particularly critical and complex at the state level.
STATE SUBSIDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Unlike K-12 education, the public benefit of higher education is not so abundantly clear
to the U.S. electorate as to gain enough consensus around the idea of free college for
everyone. Although states such as Tennessee and New York are experimenting with free
college under certain conditions, there remains considerable opposition to the notion of a
completely democratized postsecondary system. The case against free college for all
typically highlights the substantial private return of a degree and that an oversupply of
college degrees would reduce that return. Moreover, there are issues other than positive
externalities to consider when subsidizing higher education, such as equity or competing
demands for public funds.
Measuring the public benefit of higher education is a challenge compared to the
private monetary return of earning a degree. The latter is demonstrated via the wage
differential between high school and college graduates, which suggests a private rate of
return between 15 and 22 percent (Abel & Deitz, 2014; Zimmerman, 2014). Perhaps
more important for policy, the college wage differential is easily observed by the public.
Nevertheless, research consistently finds positive externalities associated with higher
education. In a thorough review of this literature as well as his own analyses, McMahon
(2009) determines that the total value of a bachelor's degree far exceeds its personal
value, over half of which consists of public externalities. McMahon concludes 52 percent
of the total investment in higher education should be publicly funded (p. 252).

3

However, the decentralized and fragmented nature of higher education
complicates McMahon’s recommendation that government should fund roughly half of
the market. States are the legal administrators of higher education, but financial provision
spans all levels of government. Federal government finances students via loans and
grants as well as a significant portion of institutional research, state government primarily
supports institutions but also students, and local government is an important contributor
to community colleges. Even appropriations within the same state are not uniformly
distributed across institutions in many cases (Chingos, 2017). Parsing out benefits that
accrue to different levels of government so that each can invest accordingly is difficult.
Mobility of those who receive a degree presents yet another complication. Federal
and state government invest in individuals' pursuit of a degree with the expectation of
some return on that investment, but the way in which they do so differs substantially.
Approximately 41 percent of federal spending on higher education is in the form of grant
aid provided directly to students and only 5 percent is support to institutions. By contrast,
about 13 percent of state spending is grant aid and 73 percent is appropriations. This
difference between federal and state investments is due in part to the risk of losing on
said investment under the assumption that benefits accrue to the government in which
one resides. The likelihood that an individual exits the U.S. is lower than the likelihood
he or she exits a state. Therefore, the federal government can attach most of its subsidy to
the individual, while state governments direct most public funding to immobile
institutions to lower tuition for in-state residents but also subsidize other aspects of
institutional operations.
Meanwhile, state spending on higher education is being squeezed by rising costs
in less discretionary budget categories such as K-12 education, Medicaid, pensions, and
prisons (Kane, 2003; Delaney, 2011). Demographic trends and recent recessions have
exacerbated state funding scarcity, leading to dramatic cuts to higher education. This, in
turn, diminishes the positive externalities that would help reduce costs in competing
budget categories (Muennig, 2000; Lochner & Moretti, 2002; McMahon, 2002).
Moreover, a slow economic recovery has led to competition for new jobs through
business tax incentives that further limit revenues. Recent trends have been described as a
self-perpetuating cycle of disinvestment in higher education (Newfield, 2016). State
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commitment to higher education as a public good, rather than a private enterprise, has
come under intense scrutiny. Stated in a recent report from the State Higher Education
Executive Officers Association (SHEEO), “For the first time in our nation’s history, more
than half of all states relied more heavily on tuition dollars to fund their public systems of
higher education than on government appropriations” (2017).
State financing of higher education has changed in terms of levels as well as
composition. Institution-specific funding per full-time equivalent student began declining
in the late 1970s (Kane, 2003), but the sharpest decline has occurred during the years
surrounding the recessions of 2002 and 2008 (Hurlburt, 2012). State support declined 12
percent in constant dollars nationwide between 2006 and 2015, falling from 61 percent to
52 percent of total institutional funding (SHEEO, 2015). Meanwhile, state expenditures
on grant aid rose 31 percent. Since 1993, merit-based aid has become a popular option for
state higher education finance. As of 2015, 25 states had broad-based merit-aid programs,
and of the 10.5 billion dollars in grant aid awarded, exclusively merit-based aid
accounted for 18 percent of all aid to undergraduates, while programs with both need and
merit components accounted for another 34.5 percent (NASSGAP, 2015).
The preference to allocate or reallocate state funds to financial aid rather than
appropriations is referred to as the high-tuition, high-aid model (HTHA) and is a central
theme in the chapters that follow. The rationale for HTHA policies is they increase
economic efficiency and equity. Decreasing appropriations increases statewide tuition,
but it provides more funding for financial aid to insulate low-income students from the
price shock. The result is a removal of subsidies for students who can afford the full cost
of college (Hansen, 1971; Hearn, 1985; Hoenack, 1971; Windham, 1976).
However, the economic case for HTHA policy is with respect to need-based aid.
The proliferation of merit-based aid complicates the debate over HTHA as it
disproportionately benefits higher-income students (Heller, 2002; Heller, 2004) and
crowds-out funding for need-based aid (Dynarski, 2002; Heller, 2002b; Long, 2007).
Throughout this work, HTHA is used as a sort of shorthand for the broad state budgetary
decision to allocate funds to grants rather than appropriations. While the level of funds
available to subsidize higher education may be at the mercy of the demands of other
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budget categories, states presumably have more control over the composition of
subsidies.
COMPLEXITY OF STATE SUBSIDIES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
A mixed methods study exploring state trends and decision-making in higher education
finance revealed that many states desired to implement HTHA policy but lacked a
coherent strategy to link available funds to policy choices (Hossler, 1997). A report by
SRI International (2012) echoes this revelation, noting that “in many cases, [state] higher
education funding policies are a historical mash-up of different priorities and strategic
decisions” (p. 3). While to some this may indicate incompetence in state government, if
one considers merely the broad economic and political factors involved in policy to
provide subsidies in higher education, then the challenge confronting state policymakers
seems rather daunting. Challenges compound considering that different subsidies may be
more or less effective at achieving different goals, such as access versus degree
completion, and there is not even clear consensus on what should be the primary goal.
States essentially have three modes of higher education finance: appropriations,
need-based financial aid, and non-need-based financial aid. 1 In addition to the absolute
amount of funding, there are two policy levers states have at their disposal with respect to
the three modes of finance. First, states can alter the composition of funding. For
example, South Carolina allocates almost 40 percent of funds to aid, almost all of which
is non-need based. Virginia allocates a similar proportion to aid but divides it about
evenly between need and non-need aid. Both Pennsylvania and Georgia allocate 20-30
percent to aid, but the former uses only need aid while the latter funds only non-need aid.
Meanwhile, New Hampshire allocates 100 percent of funds to appropriations
(NASSGAP, 2015).
The second policy lever pertains to financial aid eligibility criteria both in terms
of whether a student is eligible for any funds as well as how much funding is available to
each eligible student. Need-based aid is a fairly standard formula across states using the
difference between cost of attendance (COA) and expected family contribution (EFC),

1

Aid based on a mix of need and merit could be considered a fourth mode but is excluded here for the sake
of parsimony.
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but the amount at which need aid is capped varies. Accounting for differences in COA,
two states could allocate the same amount of total funds for need aid, one of which has a
relatively high cap that provides greater subsidy for fewer students, whereas a low cap
ensures more students receive funding that does not cover as much of COA.
The criteria for non-need aid varies widely across states. These programs can be
exclusively merit-based or a mix of need and merit. Merit can be based on high school
GPA, scores on college entrance, state, or advanced curriculum exams, or class rank. The
total amount awarded varies as well as the amount each merit component may be worth.
Also, merit aid programs and their criteria are not very stable over time. The total number
of programs fluctuates, and states modify criteria somewhat regularly, making it difficult
for scholars and policymakers to stay up to date on the landscape. Though likely outdated
now, Delaney and Ness (2010) developed a typology of state merit aid programs based
on award magnitude and academic rigor. Their typology demonstrates the degree to
which states differ with respect to the breadth of students whose college education is
subsidized as well as the size of subsidy each offers.
As with any budget decision, how a state finances higher education reflects its
politics and policy goals. Whatever those goals may be, state governments need to
understand how each type of funding affects various types of students and institutions not
only with respect to their own higher education market but also those in other states with
which it interacts. Based on the variation across states, it is not clear if states have any
common understanding regarding the impacts of its subsidies, their goals, or both.
Perhaps the most broadly applicable description of state financing in higher education,
given the discussion thus far, is that states are simply making tradeoffs among policy
preferences in a budget-constrained environment.
Suppose a state government with no particular political or economic motivation
other than to maximize the public benefits of higher education begins drafting the next
budget. Economic downturn and structural budgetary imbalances require cuts in order to
satisfy its balanced budget mandate, a portion of which must fall on appropriations. The
cost of college will increase as a result, and in turn, decrease enrollment. Shifting a
portion of the cut in appropriations to need-based grants can help insulate low-income
students whose enrollment is most sensitive to the increase in price. This is a progressive
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redistribution of wealth, though, and has limitations that depend on politics, but it is
possible the state can maintain or even increase total enrollment while spending less on
higher education if low-income students are induced to attend college by the larger
subsidy. However, policymakers suspect such students are less likely to complete a
degree and failing to do so places a burden on the student and possibly the state.
Moreover, the smaller subsidy for higher-income students not eligible for need-based aid
reduces the financial incentive to attend an in-state college. Attending an out-of-state
college lowers the likelihood they will reside in state after graduation.
In response to these concerns, the state considers directing a portion of funds
toward merit-based aid instead. On one hand, this will disproportionately subsidize
college for high-income students who would have attended college anyway. On the other
hand, it benefits talented and motivated students. Merit aid may also help retain some of
the students who would have left the state to attend a higher quality college. However, by
nature of their higher achievement and income as well as having more employment
prospects, these students are more mobile after college graduation. Using public funds for
merit aid poses its own political and economic issues regarding redistribution though. Of
course, all of this is with respect to only a state's own market. States also stand to benefit
from enacting policy that attracts and retains out-of-state students.
ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION
A few broad questions arise that if answered could help inform a coherent strategy in
financing higher education at the state level regardless of a particular objective. These
include:
1. How does a reallocation of state funds from appropriations to need- and/or meritbased aid affect student demand of higher education?
2. How might colleges and universities financially adapt to less guaranteed funding
in exchange for potential grant dollars over which they must compete?
3. What effects will such changes have on student access and success?
This work attempts to contribute answers to each of the above questions through
exposition of theory or empirical analysis.
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Chapter 2 aims to orient the reader to the policy, trends, and research pertaining to
state subsidies in higher education. There are many perspectives from which trends in
appropriations and grant aid can be viewed. The change in subsidy composition over time
across states is emphasized as motivation for further inquiry. In addition, state subsidy
programs are numerous, and their governance varies across states. An overview of how
different subsidies operate, and their common characteristics is provided to add context
for proceeding chapters. Lastly, existing literature pertaining to state subsidies in higher
education is reviewed and discussed. For state governments, guidance for the above
questions is dispersed across several lines of research in need of consolidation and, in
some cases, reconciliation.
Chapter 3 theoretically examines the response of college students to changes in
state subsidy composition. A model of student demand is developed to demonstrate the
effect of state subsidies across various subsets defined by the change in price they
experience. Specific attention is given to how effects vary according to dimensions of
student ability and income as well as institutional inputs of educational resources and
non-academic amenities. Policy implications and directions for future research are then
considered in the concluding remarks.
Chapter 4 focuses on the subsequent effects changes in demand pressures may
have on institutions. State subsidies and institutional expenditures between 1990 and
2016 are examined in order to determine whether the composition of state subsidies
causes in-state institutions to alter expenditures. Of particular interest is if the shifting of
funds from appropriations to grant aid results in a state’s postsecondary market becoming
more heterogeneous with respect to educational quality and amenities. Provided
institutional expenditures reflect college students’ preferences, changes in demand are
expected to manifest through expenditures.
Chapter 5 considers the role of college student migration with respect to state
subsidies and student outcomes. Various higher education policies impact college choice,
in turn, altering the distance students migrate to attend college. Evidence suggests that
behavior among states and institutions reflect financial incentives to attract more out-ofstate students, and whether state subsidy composition is a direct cause or not, college
students are traveling farther to go to school. However, research concerning the effect of
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distance on college student success is sparse. A theoretical framework that incorporates
distance into the processes of college choice and success is developed to demonstrate that
variation in distance has heterogeneous effects on success by type of degree pursued and
sector of institution attended.
Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation with a summary and discussion of the main
findings throughout the previous chapters. Additionally, ideas and directions for future
research are considered. The debate concerning how much of higher education should be
financed publicly is unlikely to end any time soon. Nevertheless, the fact that subsidies
exist suggests state governments expect a return on this investment. As long as provision
of higher education remains neither fully private nor public, what types of students
receive subsidies and how much will remain a critical question.
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[2]
STATE SUBSIDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
TRENDS, POLICY, AND RESEARCH
TRENDS IN SUBSIDIES AND DEFINING HIGH-TUITION, HIGH-AID
The level and composition of state subsidies in higher education have changed
substantially over the past three decades. Under mandates to keep budgets balanced,
demographic trends and economic recessions have exacerbated state funding scarcity and
allocations to K-12 education, Medicaid, pensions, and corrections generally take
precedent over higher education (Kane, 2003; Delaney, 2011). Figure 2.1 displays
average state appropriations and undergraduate aid in constant dollars per FTE between
1990 and 2016. In this span, real appropriations have declined from $8,250 to $7,100,
with significant drops corresponding to economic recessions. In contrast, grant aid per
FTE has risen from $500 to $1,000 during this time.
Behind the rise in grant aid is a considerable change in the type of grants provided
by states. States can provide grants to students solely on the basis of need, solely on the
basis of merit, or a mix of need and merit. The latter two types are jointly described as
non-need grant aid. Figure 2.2 separates the average grant aid trend in figure 1 by need
and non-need components. Non-need aid was virtually non-existent in 1990. By 2016,
states provided almost as much non-need aid as they did need aid. In fact, non-need aid
accounts for roughly 80 percent of the rise in total grant aid.
Of course, states vary along economic, political, and demographic dimensions,
which are overlooked when depicting nationwide averages. Figure 2.3 displays the
percent change from 1990 to 2016 in appropriations on the horizontal axis and
undergraduate grant aid on the vertical axis for each state. The dashed lines are located at
zero percent change, thus creating a quadrant depicting whether states increased or
decreased appropriations and grant aid. Only a few states have managed to maintain or
increase appropriations, while most have decreased appropriations by 10 to 30 percent.
Meanwhile, most states exhibit modest to substantial percent increases in grant aid since
1990. The majority of states are located within or very near the upper-left quadrant.
These states have altered the composition of subsidies, shifting toward grants over
appropriations, and it is clear these shifts differ significantly in magnitude.
11

Figure 2.1 - Average State Grant and Appropriations Dollars, 1990-2016

Figure 2.2 - Average State Need and Non-Need Grant Dollars, 1990-2016
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Figure 2.3 - Percent Change in Grant Aid and Appropriations by State

A decline in appropriations coupled with stable or increasing aid levels is
commonly referred to as the high-tuition, high-aid model (HTHA). This name can be
misleading in several respects. It is not used to suggest that a decline in appropriations
necessarily leads to an increase in tuition, though it often does but not in exact proportion
since institutions can decrease cost or raise other revenues instead of tuition. In any case,
HTHA refers more to appropriations than tuition. Perhaps a more accurate term then is
low-appropriations, high-aid (LAHA). Still, these names lead one to wonder high or low
relative to what? One option is to use national average per capita ages 18-24 as a baseline
(Toutkoushian & Shafiq, 2010).
Figure 2.4 displays state appropriations and grant aid per capita ages 18-24 in
2016. The dashed lines correspond with the average of each subsidy across all states. By
this metric, a plurality of states falls into the low-appropriations, low-aid quadrant,
though the distribution is fairly balanced across all quadrants. The examination of levels
for each subsidy does not reflect the HTHA (or LAHA) narrative. According to figure
2.4, it would seem HTLA (or LALA) is more accurate. This is because the increase in aid
has not kept pace with the decrease in appropriations, which is precisely the outcome to
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Figure 2.4 - State Grant and Appropriations Dollars Per Capita Ages 18-24

expect given states have decreased total subsidies in higher education over time. Instead,
HTHA more accurately describes the change in subsidy composition. For instance, only 7
states were considered high-aid, while 35 states were considered high-appropriations in
2006. Ten years later, the number of high-aid states has increased to 18, while the number
of high-appropriations states has decreased to 18.
This work examines the policy and impacts of state subsidies in higher education
with particular focus aimed at their composition, of which HTHA has been a fairly
dominant trend since at least 1990. Moreover, basic economic theory suggests HTHA is a
sensible strategy to increase the efficiency of state subsidies. As a result, HTHA will
occur frequently throughout. Given the various perspectives one can use to examine state
subsidies, it is therefore important to establish a clear definition of HTHA for the
purposes of the work that follows.
As a fundamental budgetary decision, whether forced by declining revenues or
driven by political will, HTHA is an increase (decrease) in the proportion of total
subsidies provided via grants (appropriations) regardless of total subsidy levels. HTHA is
typically described in the context of total subsidy decline but can also occur when there is
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an increase in total subsidies. In other words, HTHA represents the decision to target
whatever amount of state funds are available at a subset of the college student population
on the basis of some characteristic(s) that subset shares rather than distribute funds more
equally across all in-state students who attend an in-state public institution.
Figure 2.5 shows average need- and non-need undergraduate grant aid as a
proportion of total subsidies (undergraduate grants plus appropriations) in real dollars for
selected years. Despite current trends, the former remains a small proportion of total
subsidy—10 percent—relative to appropriations. Nevertheless, the change in composition
is rather substantial. The proportion of need grants has nearly doubled from
approximately 3 percent in 1990 to almost 6 percent in 2016. The proportion of non-need
grants has increased from less than 1 percent in 1990 to over 4 percent in 2016.
Figure 2.6 displays total undergraduate need- and non-need-based grant aid as a
proportion of total subsidies in 2016, the remainder of which represents appropriations.
For a few states, grant aid accounts for more than 20 percent of their total subsidy, all of
which can be in the form of need-based aid, as is the case in Vermont, non-need-based
aid, as in South Carolina or West Virginia, or a combination of the two. Similarly, a few
states allocate their total subsidy via appropriations, such as Alabama or Hawaii.
Figure 2.5 - Mean Need- and Non-Need Grants as Proportion of Total Subsidy
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Overall, these trends demonstrate the basic motivation for examining the impacts of
change in state subsidy composition. It should also be evident that the way in which
higher education is publicly funded varies considerably across states. Driving these trends
are numerous state grant aid programs and appropriations policies with various eligibility
and payment features. It is important to understand how these state subsidies operate on a
basic level as well as their general components over which states may or may not differ.
Figure 2.6 - State Proportions of Need, Non-Need, and Appropriations, 2016
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SURVEYING STATE SUBSIDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
The National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) has
conducted annual surveys since 1970 to report the landscape of financial aid provided at
the state level. As of 2016, NASSGAP identified 583 unique state programs. Figure 2.7
shows the distribution of these programs by type. Though states subsidize higher
education through various programs, such as loans, tuition waivers, and work-study,
almost 65 percent of all programs are grants. Of the $12 billion awarded in total, grants
accounted for almost 90 percent and involve nearly 98 percent of recipients across all
state programs. State grants may not make up the entire landscape of state subsidies
targeted to students, but they represent most of it.
There is considerable variety in characteristics across grant programs, such as
eligibility that is based residential status, whether the student attends an in- or out-of-state
institution, enrollment intensity (e.g. full-time, half-time), and class (e.g. undergraduate,
graduate). As previously mentioned, a key distinction between grant programs is whether
they are awarded on the basis of need, merit, or a combination of both. Figure 2.8 shows
the total number of grant programs according to this distinction for 2016. Over half of
Figure 2.7 - Total Grant and Aid Programs by Type, 2016
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Figure 2.8 - Total Grant Programs by Type of Aid, 2016

all grant programs are exclusively based on need, one-third are based only on merit,
while mixed aid accounts for the remaining 12 percent. 2
Determining eligibility on the basis of need is fairly uniform across states. Need is
calculated as the cost of attendance (COA) at the chosen institution minus expected
family contribution (EFC). Tuition and fees, room and board, books, supplies,
transportation, loan fees, and other miscellaneous expenses are included in the calculation
of COA. To determine EFC, a family’s taxed and untaxed income, assets, benefits, family
size and the number of family members attending college during the year are used.
Students or families with incomes below $25 thousand have a $0 EFC. 3
States determine how much to allocate to grant programs, so total expenditures
on need grants is not mechanically responsive to the formula for need. Nevertheless,
trends in COA and EFC determine how many students are in need and the size of award,
which can place pressure on states to increase or decrease the total amount allocated. For
example, the combination of rising tuition and stagnant incomes leads to more students
needing larger awards. In turn, fewer eligible students receive aid if a state does not
increase its allocation. In 2016, 24 percent of need grants funded all eligible students.
2
3

The number of merit aid programs includes those that are not considered broad-based merit programs.
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/fafsa/next-steps/how-calculated
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A variety of additional features can be used to impact how need grants are
distributed across students. One such feature is the maximum award a student can
receive. All else equal, a high max relative to COA implies fewer students will have more
of their cost subsidized. Figure 2.9 displays the distribution of primary state need grant
programs according to the proportion of the state’s COA that is covered by the maximum
award in 2015. Most states cover between 0 and 20 percent of their average COA, though
there is considerable positive skewness. Since students eligible for state need grants are
also likely eligible for federal Pell Grants, it is expected that states do not cover the full
COA. Taking the maximum Pell award for 2015 into account, the median percentage of
remaining COA covered by the max state award is 44 percent. Without EFC, it is unclear
how many programs approach the full COA accounting for family wealth. From a
programmatic perspective, half of states have structured their maximum need awards so
that over half of COA minus Pell is covered for students with a $0 EFC.
There has long been concern over the perverse incentive for institutions to
manipulate tuition so as to maximize the amount of revenue received through need-based
grants. Award caps guard against this incentive going unchecked. Similarly, some states
also place caps on EFC or income eligible to receive funding regardless of need, thus
Figure 2.9 - Proportion of COA Covered by Max Need Award, 2015
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preventing need-based aid going to higher-income students who attend institutions with
high tuition. Additionally, some states condition eligibility on attending a public
institution, which typically does not have autonomous control over its tuition.
Comparatively, determining merit is much more variable across states. Specific
eligibility criteria and how each are weighted in determining award amount are virtually
unique to each state that has such a program. However, there are a few components over
which merit programs can be categorized. 4 Table 2.1 reports the percentage of merit and
mixed grant programs that include common measures of merit, their source of funding,
and the average award per recipient in 2016. Grades are the most commonly used merit
component for both types of aid, followed by test scores for which the ACT or SAT are
typically used. Relatively few programs use class rank or some other performance metric
such as extracurricular involvement or community service.
Most of these programs receive general funds from the state, though some are
funded via a state lottery. Very few are funded by a special tax or pooled tuition. The use
of lottery funds for merit aid potentially complicates the narrative of state governments
determining the composition of subsidies. Lottery funds are typically earmarked for
Table 2.1 - Merit and Mixed Aid Characteristics, 2016
Merit Aid
Merit Components
Test score
Class rank
Grades
Other
Funding Source
General Funds
Lottery
Special Tax
Tuition
Average Award
Total

4

Mixed Aid

41%
20%
81%
20%

31%
14%
91%
11%

76%
15%
1%
0%
$5,844
123

70%
9%
2%
2%
$2,709
44

For a more formally developed typology of merit aid, see Delaney and Ness (2010).
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certain programs. Therefore, the decision-making process is not as straightforward as
dividing a common pool of funds across types of subsidy.
A common criticism of merit-based aid for which there is some evidence is that it
crowds-out funding for need-based aid (Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2006; Long & Riley, 2007;
Adelson, 2006; Dynarski, 2002; Heller, 2002). However, the counter has been made that
much of this criticism assumes funding for merit-based aid would be automatically
transferred to need-based aid. Merit-based aid programs have been characterized as a
kind of entitlement in many states since all eligible students are guaranteed funding, in
turn, making any attempt to shrink such programs difficult compared to need-based
programs (Doyle, 2010). This may especially be the case for lottery funded programs.
Still, even among the broad merit-based programs that are at the center of this debate,
more are funded via general funds than lottery (Delaney & Ness, 2010).
Much of the concern over merit-based grant programs stems from what some
consider to be an inequitable distribution of subsidies toward higher-income students.
Figure 2.10 compares how awards are distributed across income groups between the
three types of grant aid using average dollars age 18-24 per capita in 2016. As expected,
the amount of money distributed on the basis of need is decreasing in income with those
Figure 2.10 - Average Dollars Distributed Age 18-24 Per Capita by Income, 2016
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in the below $20 thousand and $20-$40 thousand receiving significantly more money on
average than those in higher income groups. Mixed grants follow a similar pattern except
that those in the $20-$40 thousand range receive slightly more than those below $20
thousand presumably due to the inclusion of merit. The distribution of merit-based grant
aid is drastically different. Those with incomes above $100 thousand receive the most
funds; more per capita than the low-income groups for need or mixed grants.
Interestingly, the distribution is fairly uniform across the low- and high-income groups
with somewhat less going to the middle-income groups.
The final type of subsidy to consider here is appropriations. Unlike financial aid,
there is not a well-known compendium of information on state appropriations policy.
Aside from the general decline in the level of appropriations and the recent popularity of
performance-based budgeting in higher education, differences in appropriations policy
across states receives little attention compared to financial aid. Though appropriations are
primarily driven by enrollment, the specific components upon which the amount of
funding institutions receive from the state is determined vary considerably.
A 2012 SRI International report provides perhaps the most recent and
comprehensive information regarding state appropriations according to Chingos & Baum
(2017). Figure 2.11 comes directly from the report and displays the different methods
states use for allocating appropriations. According to the report, 17 states use a formula to
determine institutional funding, while another 14 states use a hybrid method where a
formula may be used for some institutions or sectors but not all. Funding in 18 states is
non-formula-based, the two most common varieties of which include a “Base Plus”
method (i.e. incremental change from last year’s allocation) and funding based on
legislative priorities, such as peer equity with other states.
State formulas vary, and many states do not fully fund the amount indicated by
the formula in times of fiscal stress. SRI International found that formulas typically
consist of a subset of 10 budgetary functional areas, but three elements are common
across all states: 1) instructional activities based on either enrolled or completed credit
hours, 2) operations and maintenance of the physical plant, and 3) other components
based on a percentage of the instructional funding level and therefore indirectly tied to
enrollment levels (SRI, 2012). The result of this complexity and variation is significantly
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Figure 2.11 - States’ Methods for Distributing Appropriations

different funding across institutions within states. According to a report from the Urban
Institute, “In 18 states, the best-funded research university receives more than twice as
much state appropriation per student as the research university with the lowest funding.
The range is more than $10,000 a student in five states” (Chingos & Baum 2017, p. 8).
The within-state variation in appropriations has not been well-examined
theoretically or empirically. Though not particularly impactful for the proportion of total
subsidy that is ultimately allocated to institutions rather than students, it is important to
be aware of the underlying mechanics of appropriations and their differences across
states. These details highlight key comparisons when considering the allocation of state
funds across subsidies. On one hand, appropriations are tied to enrollment and therefore
share the fundamental purpose with grant programs to subsidize college. On the other
hand, appropriations are distributed to institutions and fund operations with which
students do not regularly interact or even observe. Whether or to what extent grant aid
can substitute appropriations without significantly distorting the higher education market
is unclear. As the next section will demonstrate, there is considerable literature examining
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the effects of subsidies on aspects of higher education, but the specific impacts of subsidy
composition need more study.
RESEARCH ON STATE SUBSIDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
To some, the decline of state appropriations for public colleges and universities may
seem like a recent phenomenon, but institution-specific funding per full-time equivalent
(FTE) student began declining in the late 1970s (Kane, 2003). Some of the earliest
research on state subsidies emerged just prior to this, examining the distributional effects
of changes in California’s subsidies (Hansen, 1969; Pechman, 1970; Hansen, 1971). The
key question was whether state funding of broad-based subsidies via appropriations
disproportionately benefit higher-income students (i.e. regressive).
Hoenack (1971) derived maximizing conditions for the state of California under
various objectives of increasing equality between student income quartiles. He concluded
that greater equality can be achieved if the state redirected its subsidies toward the bottom
quartiles, but this comes at the cost of lower enrollment among the top quartiles, choosing
to enroll into private institutions or out-of-state. Eventually, equality results in lower
overall enrollment and a significant cost to the state. Enrollment changes were simulated
using an estimated demand for higher education for each quartile. To estimate demand
Hoenack used differences in travel costs between high schools and campuses,
representing one of the first direct connections made between state finance policy and
student migration. The results of the simulation showed that appropriations in California
were regressive.
The prevailing thought was efficiency and equity could be improved by diverting
appropriations to need-based aid (Hansen, 1971; Hearn, 1985; Hoenack, 1971; Windham,
1976), but this argument has been challenged by more recent empirical work that found
appropriations to be primarily neutral or slightly progressive (Johnson, 2006).
Toutkoushian and Shafiq (2010) developed an economic model for optimal state funding
between appropriations and need-based aid. They concluded that a state should
implement a system of subsidy exclusively on the basis of need if the goal is to maximize
college enrollment. The authors reach this conclusion assuming the positive externality of
enrollment is the same for all students, thus the gain in positive externalities due to higher
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enrollment among low-income students exceed any loss from lower enrollment among
high-income students.
Broadly, the research indicates that appropriations increases overall enrollment
and retention of college students within the state (Mixon & Hsing1994; Mak & Mancur,
2003; Groen, 2004; Long, 2004; Perna & Titus, 2004; Orsuwan & Heck, 2009;
Toutkoushian & Hillman, 2012). The effect of need-based aid is mixed in this regard
(Heller, 1999; Perna & Titus, 2004; Somers, 1993; Kane, 1995; Toutkoushian & Hillman,
2012). Lastly, the evidence is consistent that merit-based aid has a positive effect on
enrollment and retention of resident students (Dynarski, 2002a; Kane, 2003; Cornwell,
Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Desjardiins & McCall, 2009; Domina, 2014; Harrington,
2016).
Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004) stand out in the literature for modeling a system of
simultaneous equations for need-based grant aid, resident tuition, nonresident tuition, and
nonresident enrollment among flagship universities across states. Theirs represents the
first attempt to empirically examine the effect of appropriations on nonresident
enrollment. They find no evidence that institutions raise nonresident enrollment in
response to a decline in appropriations, but rather, increase resident and nonresident
tuition. They also find institutions raise resident and nonresident tuition as the average
tuition in the region increases, and students migrate more when tuition in their region is
higher. In sum, as states decrease appropriations, institutions raise tuition, and students
respond with a higher likelihood to migrate out-of-state.
Similarly, Jacquette and Curs (2015) investigated nonresident enrollment
response to state appropriations utilizing a larger sample of four-year institutions during a
more recent time period when state funding was changing more dramatically. They find
decreases in appropriations are associated with higher nonresident enrollment but not
resident enrollment. In other words, institutions increased the share of nonresident
students as a source of additional revenue. The authors mention they could not determine
how institutions achieved this change in nonresident enrollment but hypothesize that
institutions utilize enrollment management techniques (e.g. prospective student searches
and recruitment). The possibility that student demand also changes such that students are
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more willing to migrate out-of-state, thus complementing institutional response to
increase the supply of nonresident openings is not seriously considered.
Perna and Titus (2004) analyze the relationship between a variety of state policies
and student choice of public versus private as well as in-state versus out-of-state
institutions using a multilevel model controlling for various student- and state-level
factors. State appropriations, need-based grant aid, and tuition are included in the
analysis. They find a decline in state appropriations increases the likelihood of attending
a public out-of-state or private institution, while an increase in need-based aid increases
the likelihood of in-state attendance to both public and private four-year institutions. The
authors also include a composite measure of student SES to demonstrate systematic
differences in college choice. They find out-of-state and in-state private four-year
attendance is increasing in SES, while in-state public four-year attendance was strictly
decreasing in SES. This suggests state policies that redistribute subsidies on the basis of
wealth will have heterogeneous effects across students and college sectors.
Using state-level panel data, Toutkoushian and Hillman (2012) examine similar
relationships but also include state merit-based grant aid. They find appropriations to
increase enrollment among in-state residents. Increases in merit-based aid had a larger
impact on in-state enrollment than appropriations and reduced out-of-state enrollment.
Lastly, there was no evidence that need-based aid had an effect on in-state or out-of-state
enrollment. Overall, their study shares the most in common with this work in terms of
framing state financing of higher education across these three types of subsidies.
Work by Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006), Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg
(2013), and Hoxby (1997; 2000) are particularly influential in considering the impacts of
state subsidies on the higher education market when students differ along dimensions of
ability and income. Each work develops partial or general equilibrium models of higher
education to demonstrate a variety of outcomes. One outcome common across these
models is that greater competition generally leads to higher costs/tuition, and greater
stratification across institutions along student ability and income. This result is in part
driven by the assumption that educational inputs, such as libraries or faculty quality,
generate a greater return when used by higher-ability students or among higher ability
peers. Institutional profit, quality, or prestige—however their objective may be
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conceived—is increasing in the ability of its student body and therefore continually
increase educational inputs to attract students of higher ability, which is positively
correlated with income and requires higher income to attend.
Hoxby (2000) identifies specific drivers of market competition which include
technological advances in telecommunication and travel, more transparency with regard
to institutional and student quality, and tuition reciprocity agreements between states. She
shows in-state attendance has declined consistently among public universities during
1949-1994 and the percentage of all students who applied to at least one out-of-state
bachelor's-granting college has increased from 23.4 percent in 1972 to 43.2 percent in
1992. Moreover, the deterrence of distance-from-home on college choice has declined, a
phenomenon that has since been examined in some more detail (Long, 2004).
Though not considered by Hoxby, a change in state subsidy composition
consistent with HTHA also drives competition, analogous to school vouchers at the K-12
level. Rather than public funds going to institutions on a more egalitarian basis vis-à-vis
appropriations, funds are provided to students over which institutions must compete.
Also, it is possible HTHA policy is similar to tuition reciprocity agreements with respect
to interstate tuition differentials. For students who are ineligible for aid, the in-state cost
of college is expected to increase, approaching the unsubsidized price of college, thus
approaching the tuition of out-of-state options.
Using their model of the market, Epple et al. (2013) simulate the impact of a
$1,000 decrease in appropriations accompanied by a $1,000 increase in tuition for both
in- and out-of-state students. Enrollment in state colleges declines 8 percent primarily
among low-income students, while enrollment at private colleges increases slightly. This
increase in demand for private colleges allows them to replace some higher-ability
middle-income students for lower-ability higher-income students as well as increase
tuition and expenditures. Meanwhile, the decrease in public college demand leads them to
increase the ability admission threshold to in-state students (the authors model
institutions to be quality-maximizing) and decrease the threshold for out-of-state
students. As a result, the proportion on nonresident students increases.
The work by Epple et al. (2013) and Hoxby (1997, 2000) complement many of
the studies previously discussed, revealing some of the mechanisms responsible for the
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observed effects of subsidies on student and institutional behavior. For instance, not only
do public institutions seek more nonresident students to recoup revenue lost through
lower appropriations, as Jacquette and Curs (2015) conclude, but the heterogenous
demand across student ability and income also contribute to this compositional change in
students. Student heterogeneity in ability and income is critical to the discussion of
HTHA, as it represents a shift in funding based on those very same dimensions. Though
not examined, a decrease in appropriations accompanied by an increase in grant aid
among subsets of students based on ability or income would likely compound some of the
outcomes already discussed.
Models of the higher education market generally conceive institutional inputs as a
single dimension of quality, which is indicative of the ubiquity of the human capital
framework that explains college-going behavior as a function of the return to a degree.
However, studies have shown college choice is also affected by college inputs that likely
do not contribute to the value of a degree and instead a student’s consumption while in
college (Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2018; Tuckman, 1970; Mixon, 1992; Mixon & Hsing,
1994). Including amenities as an input separate from educational quality could lend new
insights into how changes to state subsidies affect students and institutions.
Recent work by Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2018) is especially relevant to the
emergence of college amenities as an important factor in the higher education market.
They are the first to demonstrate differential demand elasticities for educational quality,
measured as expenditures on instruction and academic support, and amenities, measured
as expenditures on student services and auxiliary enterprises across student ability and
income. Higher-ability students, as measured by standardized math scores, have a
substantially greater demand for academic spending but similar demand for consumption
amenities. Conversely, higher-income students have a higher demand for consumption
amenities than lower-income students but similar demand for academic spending. 5
The theoretical models just discussed only account for heterogeneous demand for
academic quality as a function of ability and/or income, not amenities. Furthermore, no
5

The authors also include distance in their analysis and find that higher-ability and wealthier students are
less sensitive to distance. I interpret this to be a byproduct of their higher demands for academic quality
and/or amenities given that each are weakly increasing in distance—a subject that will be revisited in
Chapter 5.
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work has theoretically or empirically examined institutional supply-side behavior of
academic quality along with amenities. Inclusion of amenities is arguably a small
extension to existing theory, but it has serious implications for policy, including policy
pertaining to state subsidies.
To reiterate, state subsidy composition involves the weighing of various priorities;
to provide subsidies on an approximately egalitarian basis and lower the cost of college
for all students or to target subsidies toward a subset of students on the basis of need (i.e.
income) or merit (i.e. ability). The prevailing HTHA trend within many states decreases
the cost of college for lower-income and/or higher-ability students and allows costs to
rise for any student ineligible for aid. This presumably alters the ability and income
distribution of enrolled students as well as which institutions—high/low academic
quality, high/low amenities—experience an increase or decrease in demand. In turn,
HTHA presumably has a secondary effect of altering institutional expenditures in
response to changes in demand pressure. And, if state higher education finance is altering
the colleges chosen by students, it is necessarily altering the distances they migrate to
pursue a degree. Might there be unintended consequences for student success? The
remaining chapters set out to investigate these possibilities.
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[3]
STUDENT DEMAND AND STATE SUBSIDY COMPOSITION
This chapter develops a theoretical model of student demand to demonstrate the effects of
composition in state higher education subsidies. Existing models of the higher education
market offer insight into the effects of subsidizing the price of college when demand for
college differs across student ability and income (Hoxby, 1977, 2000; Epple et al., 2006,
2013, Jacob et al., 2018), but the following work deviates in two notable ways. First,
rather than model college quality as a single attribute related to academic quality (e.g.
instruction, peer ability), college quality is conceived to consist of academic as well as
non-academic resources referred to as amenities. This two-attribute conceptualization of
college quality allows for heterogeneous demand for academic quality and amenities
across levels of student ability and income that is evident in recent research (Jacob et al.,
2018). Second, features of eligibility and distribution unique to state subsidy programs
are thoroughly examined, among which student ability and income are key factors. The
theoretical results explain certain higher education market phenomena in a novel way and
motivate numerous avenues for future research which are discussed in the concluding
remarks.
The proceeding sections give a somewhat technical treatment to a straightforward
idea regarding the relationship between state subsidies and college student demand, the
broad strokes of which are helpful to describe at the outset. College goods and services
can be categorized as either an educational resource or amenity. Student demand for
educational resources is increasing in student ability, and student demand for amenities is
increasing (or at least non-decreasing) in income. A shift of state funds from
appropriations to need-based aid diverges prices among students on the basis of income,
while a shift of state funds from appropriations to merit-based aid diverges prices among
students on the basis of ability. Moreover, for students ineligible to receive aid, the price
of public in-state college approaches the price of out-of-state or in-state private college,
making these institutions more likely to be chosen among students who generally have
higher demand for amenities, especially if merit-based aid is part of a state’s subsidy
composition. In short, the HTHA trend in state subsidies present over the last 25 years
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drives a divergence in demand between educational resources and amenities that has not
been thoroughly examined.
HETEROGENEOUS STUDENT DEMAND FOR COLLEGE INPUTS
Assume students differ continuously along exogenous ability a and income y. Each
college offers a package of educational inputs e, such as the quality and number of
faculty, labs, and libraries, as well as non-educational, amenity benefits b, such as
dormitories, cafeterias, and fitness facilities. Colleges differ continuously along these two
inputs, both of which enter into student utility. Though colleges are discreet units, the
higher education market is large and variable such that the college inputs over which
students maximize utility—e and b—can be treated as continuous. The cost of attending a
college given its bundle of e and b is denoted as P. Lastly, colleges set a minimum ability
threshold for admission denoted 𝑎, for which there is a function 𝑔�𝑎� that maps to the

quantity of per-student educational resources the institution supplies.

Since Manski and Wise (1983) college choice is generally modeled theoretically
and empirically using some variant of McFadden’s (1973) choice model where a student
chooses the institution that generates the greatest utility compared to all other feasible
options, including the option of not attending college. Incorporating the terms described
above choice can be represented by the following condition in which student i chooses
college j if
𝑈𝑖𝑖 �𝑒𝑗 (𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑏𝑗 (𝑦𝑖 ), 𝑑𝑖𝑖 , �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖 �, 𝜖𝑖𝑖 � ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 ; 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎𝑖

(1)

where d is the nonmonetary cost of migrating the distance between a student’s home to
the college, �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖 � is numeraire consumption of all other goods. 6 The error term 𝜖 is

an idiosyncratic preference the student has for an institution and is assumed to be
independent and identically extreme value distributed. Equation (1) leads to the
estimation of the probability that student i attends feasible college j conditional on
educational resources, amenities, ability, income, and price.
It is assumed student utility is increasing in educational resources
𝜕𝜕

amenities 𝜕𝜕 > 0 at decreasing rates

6

𝜕2 𝑢
𝜕2 𝑒

𝜕2 𝑢

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

> 0 and

< 0 and 𝜕2 𝑏 < 0. Student ability and income are

The role of distance in college choice and success is explored in detail in Chapter 5.

31

included in the arguments for e and b in (1), respectively, due to the following
assumptions regarding utility and student type:
𝜕2 𝑢

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

and

𝜕2 𝑢

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

>0

(2)

≥0

(3)

where (2) states the marginal utility of an additional unit of educational resources is
increasing in ability, and (3) states the marginal utility of an additional unit of amenities
is nondecreasing in income. 7 It is therefore assumed that demand for educational
resources is increasing in ability
𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕
)
𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕

𝜕(

𝜕𝜕

>0

(4)

and demand for amenities is nondecreasing in income
𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕
)
𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕

𝜕(

𝜕𝜕

≥ 0.

(5)

Figure 3.1 illustrates the effect of these assumptions on demand between e and b
as income increases—also known as the income expansion path (IEP)—between two
hypothetical students. Student A has higher ability than student B. The solid lines
illustrate demand if student preferences are homothetic (equations 3 and 5 equal 0). As
income increases, the quantities demanded of e and b between students increasingly
diverge with student A demanding a greater quantity of educational inputs relative to
amenities and student B demanding greater quantities of amenities relative to educational
resources. The dashed lines illustrate IEPs if demand for amenities is increasing in
income. The quantity demanded of e and b is still divergent between students, but the
quantity demanded of educational inputs relative to amenities is no longer constant.

7

The intuition for (2) being positive is that educational inputs contribute to the production of human
resource capital and ability is the technology one possesses that serves as a multiplier in the production
process. The intuition for (3) being positive is less clear. It could be due to students reaching a limit to how
much educational resources they can consume, mistakes in distinguishing amenities from educational
inputs while ability and income are positively correlated, or amenities being close substitutes with other
goods but at a lower per-unit price due to cost sharing across students. Jacob et al. (2018) find no evidence
of heterogenous demand for amenities by income when using a random coefficients model.
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Figure 3.1 - Example Income Expansion Paths

There are 4,275 Title IV participating, 2-year-and-above, degree-granting
institutions in the U.S. according to the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS). One could imagine these institutions placed in the figure above according to
their per-student quantities of e and b, providing a virtual continuum of options that make
marginal changes in demand possible. Intuitively, the probability that a student chooses
to attend a particular institution is represented by its proximity to the student’s optimal
choice within the two-good space in figure 3.1, allowing for randomness in choice due to
idiosyncratic preferences for certain institutions. This optimal choice is the latent student
demand for colleges’ attributes from which we observe a student’s choice of the college
that most closely supplies the optimal quantity of educational and amenity inputs. 8
The unsubsidized price of college can be represented by the following equation
𝑃 = 𝑝𝑐 (𝑒 + 𝑏)

(6)

where 𝑝𝑐 is the per-unit price of e and b. Equation (6) asserts that educational resources

and amenities are essentially inseparable in price, but their quantities can be separately
observed. Moving forward the primary focus will be the effect of state subsidies on 𝑝𝑐

and the subsequent effects on demand between e and b. State subsidies do not
8

An alternative theoretical approach is the (linear) attributes model (Lancaster, 1966) where students are
limited to consumption between one institution and at least one other good contributing to two or more
activities that directly generate utility. Features of the higher education market do not translate naturally to
this model, however. For example, there is not a continuous quantity of the institution attached to price.
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discriminate between the costs of e and b, thus they would not distort the price ratio
between the two if (6) were modeled with two prices. 9
From (1) it is obvious that subsidies decrease P at a given level of e and b, and
therefore increases the likelihood that a student chooses the subsidized institution over
the unsubsidized institution, all else equal. A change in 𝑝𝑐 operates like a change in

income with respect to optimal choice of e and b as there is no substitution effect between

the two to consider. In this case, a detailed analysis of choice between e and b as price
changes would be unnecessary if subsidies were simply lump-sum provided to all
students, as is the case with appropriations. Whatever the demand of e relative to b in a
state is would not be altered, only the absolute quantities. However, it is the fact that
grants are targeted on the basis of ability or income and that demand for e relative to b is
heterogeneous in these dimensions that makes changes in 𝑝𝑐 due to allocative decisions

across various subsidies lead to potentially novel results and important implications for
policy.
STATE SUBSIDIES
A state has three modes of subsidy: appropriations, need-based grants, and merit-based
grants. The following assumptions are made regarding their provision: 1) the state
allocates a total amount of funds between the three subsidies, thus making their
respective allocations fully interdependent, 2) appropriations are delivered to in-state
public institutions based on enrollment and fully pass through to reduce the cost of
attendance by the amount allocated per-student, 3) need-based grants can be applied to
only in-state public colleges, 4) merit-based grants can be applied to any in-state college,
and 5) merit-based grants do not displace need-based grants. 10

9

Some amenities are clearly separated in prices, such as room and board, while others are included in
tuition. How many resource categories are separated from tuition as well as how many of them are
mandatory versus à la carte varies across institutions.
10
These assumptions are an approximation and the rules pertaining to grants vary across states as discussed
in Chapter 2. In states where grants have a different funding source from appropriations, allocations are
unlikely to be fully interdependent. Full pass-through of appropriations assumes colleges do not increase
inputs. A majority of states’ primary need-based grant programs do restrict funds to public in-state colleges,
while some states have separate need-based programs for private in-state colleges. Extenuating
circumstances can lead to state grant funds being applicable to out-of-state colleges. Information on
displacement between need- and merit-based grants is not readily available. At the federal level, Pell grants
are not displaced by other funding sources.
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Let 𝑃[𝑂,𝑅,𝑈] denote a student’s total expenditure on college given income, prices,

and quantities chosen of e and b. Also, let l denote state appropriations, m merit-based
grants, and n need-based grants, all of which are expressed as per-student amounts.
According to the above assumptions, students potentially face three alternative prices
based on the type of college and grant eligibility, and given quantities of e and b,
represented by the following equations:
𝑃𝑂 = 𝑝𝑐 (𝑒 ∗ + 𝑏 ∗ )

𝑃𝑅 = [𝑝𝑐 − 𝑚(𝑎)](𝑒 ∗ + 𝑏 ∗ )

(7)

𝑃𝑈 = �𝑝𝑐 − 𝑙 − 𝑚(𝑎) − 𝑛�𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑦)��(𝑒 ∗ + 𝑏 ∗ )

where PO is the total expenditure on college outside of the state, 𝑃𝑅 is the total
expenditure on in-state private college, and 𝑃𝑈 is the total expenditure for in-state public
college.

The amount of merit-based grant earned is a function of ability given by the
following equation
𝑚 = min{𝑚
� , max[cm ∙ �𝑎 − 𝑎�, 0]}

(8)

where 𝑚
� is the maximum merit-based award, c is a non-negative constant multiplier, and
𝑎 is the minimum ability required to receive a merit-based award. Equation (8) means

students either receive the maximum merit-based award, an amount that is a linear
function of his ability above some minimum threshold, or no award. Let S denote the
total population of students in a state and 𝑠𝑚 denote eligibility for a merit-based grant

where 𝑠𝑚𝑚 = 1 if 𝑎𝑖 > 𝑎 and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the total number of students eligible
for a merit-based grant is

𝑆𝑚 = ∑𝑆𝑖=1 𝑎𝑖𝑅𝑅 > 𝑎

(9)

where students are indexed by i. The superscripts R and U correspond with (7) in that
only students attending in-state private or public institutions are eligible to receive a
merit-based grant. Eligibility versus actual receipt of a grant is a technical distinction.
Equation (9) could alternatively be written without the superscripts, thus broadening the
definition of eligibility to include any students who could receive a grant depending on
the type of institution chosen. This distinction is relevant when considering how much
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funding a state is actually liable for allocating and involves college choice to be discussed
in a later section.
A state can alter its program via the minimum ability threshold, which alters the
number of eligible students, the maximum award, or the constant multiplier, both of
which alter the amount each eligible student receives. As student ability increases, the
amount awarded to them increases. Equation (8) assumes this relationship to be linear
and so the marginal change in merit-based grants with respect to ability is
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

⎧
⎪

0

𝑖𝑖 𝑎 < 𝑎
�
𝑚

= 𝑐𝑚 𝑖𝑖 𝑎 < 𝑎 < 𝑐𝑚 + 𝑎
⎨
�
𝑚
⎪ 0 𝑖𝑖 𝑐 + 𝑎 < 𝑎
𝑚
⎩

(10)

which is simply the value of the constant multiplier. As the quantity of e demanded
increases in a student’s ability (

𝜕𝑒 ∗
𝜕𝜕

> 0), the provision of a merit-based award

simultaneously decreases 𝑝𝑐 by 𝑐𝑚 , amplifying the divergence in demand for e and b
between higher- and lower-ability students.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the effect of merit-based grants on choice between e and b
among two hypothetical students in a state that also subsidizes via appropriations.
Student A has lower ability than student B and is not eligible for a merit-based grant.
Therefore, he faces the same budget constraint for out-of-state and in-state private
colleges. 11 Due to state appropriations, student A could consume greater e and b at a
public institution. Student B faces the same constraint as student A does for out-of-state
colleges but her higher ability earns a merit-based grant that allows her to consume
greater quantities at in-state private institutions at point E as well as public institutions on
top of the state appropriations at point F. Note also that the ability constraint is higher for
student B than it is for student A and is nonbinding in this case. If the state market
comprised only of the two students in figure 3.2, then the effect of merit-based grants on
demand for higher education amplifies the divergence in quantities of e and b demanded.

11

It is important to note that, as in figure 3.2, these budget constraints do not exhaust all income. Therefore,
a student could choose optimal e and b anywhere along the IEP depending numeraire consumption. This is
why a point such as D can be optimal. If x was included in the figure, then point D would be at the
intersection of the academic and the exhaustive budget constraint. The implicit assumption in these figures
when comparing two students is they allocate the same portion of income to numeraire consumption.
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Figure 3.2 - Effect of Merit-based Grant on Choice

The amount of need-based grants is a function of income and total expenditures
on public in-state college given by the following equation
𝑛 = min{𝑛�, max[𝑃𝑈 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑦), 0]}

(11)

where 𝑛� is the maximum need-based award and EFC is expected family contribution.12
Equation (11) establishes that a student receives either the maximum need-based award,

the amount necessary to offset the difference between total expenditure and EFC, or no
award. Eligibility for a need-based grant is denoted as 𝑠𝑛𝑛 where 𝑠𝑛 = 1 if 𝑃𝑖𝑈 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸 and
0 otherwise. The total number of students eligible for a need-based grant is therefore
𝑆𝑛 = ∑𝑆𝑖=1 𝑃𝑖𝑈 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑖 )

(12)

EFC is a fairly complex formula that involves student dependency, income, assets, and
family size. For simplicity, let EFC follow the formula

12

As discussed in Chapter 2, need-based grant aid is determined by COA-EFC. COA includes costs not
captured by P as it has been defined here, so (16) is only representative of how need-based aid is
determined. This distinction should not make much difference on the demand side but potentially has
important implications if the supply-side was considered. For instance, tuition at public institutions is
partially controlled by state government in many cases whereas amenity categories are not. If a public
institution cannot raise tuition enough to offset a reduction in state appropriations, it may be inclined to
raise the cost of room or board to recoup lost revenue since these items are included in COA.

37

𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑦) = max[𝑐𝑛 �𝑦 − 𝑦� , 0]

(13)

where 0 < 𝑐𝑛 < 1 and 𝑦 is a minimum income threshold. Therefore, the change in EFC
with respect to income can be described by the following conditional equation
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

=�

0 𝑖𝑖 𝑦 < 𝑦

𝑐𝑛 𝑖𝑖 𝑦 > 𝑦

(14)

Holding numeraire consumption constant, 𝑃𝑈 in (11) changes for two reasons.

The first is a change in per-unit price 𝑝𝑐 . The marginal change in need-based grant
awarded with respect to 𝑝𝑐 is

0 𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸
= �1 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛�
𝜕𝑝𝑐
0 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛� < 𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕

(15)

meaning there is a one-to-one offset in price for those eligible for need-based grants up to
the maximum award. a one-dollar decline in, say, appropriations would be offset by a one
dollar increase in need-based grants for those eligible who do not reach the maximum
award and attend a public institution. If colleges were allowed to price discriminate in
this model, (15) motivates the concern that need-based grants enable colleges to extract
greater rents. A college could simply raise its price of attendance on eligible students
until the maximum award is reached. 13 The second case in which there is a change in 𝑃𝑈

is with a change in income. The change in EFC due to a change in income must also be
considered. Doing so, the marginal change in need-based grant with respect to income is
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

=�

𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕

0 𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸

− 𝑐𝑛 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛

(16)

0 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛 < 𝑃𝑈

which implies there is less than a one-to-one offset for each dollar allocated toward
college as income increases unless income is below the minimum threshold in which case
𝑐𝑛 = 0.

Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of need-based grants on choice between e and b

among the same hypothetical students in figure 3.2. The overall effect is similar to merit13

Epple et al. (2013) demonstrate this result with respect to federal grant aid (i.e. Pell) and private
institutions. Since states can limit the extent to which public universities raise tuition and many states limit
the receipt of need-based grants to attendance at public institutions, this perverse incentive is less of a
concern.
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based grants in that the budget constraint shifts outward, potentially increasing the
divergence in demand between e and b. However, since need-based grants are a function
of income, which itself enters into the graph, how the budget constraint moves in
response to price is somewhat more complicated.
The maximum need-based award 𝑛 establishes a floor beneath which every dollar

allocated to e or b at an in-state public institution is fully matched for those students

whose income is below the minimum threshold 𝑦. 14 All of these low-income students

share this minimum budget constraint, and since the funds cannot be allocated toward
other goods, optimal choice falls on line Z regardless of preferences. Beyond line Z, each

dollar allocated toward college is offset by a proportion equal to 1 − 𝑐𝑛 . As a result, this
proportion is equal to the amount an eligible student’s budget constraint expands.

Suppose line Y represents the budget constraint for an in-state public institution if
there were no need-based grants and given an allocation to other goods. The budget
constraint with a need-based subsidy expands outward by the percentage of each dollar
offset by the grant to line Y′. However, in this example, the maximum award is reached
Figure 3.3 - Effect of Need-based Grants on Choice

14

For example, dependent students in a family with an income below $25,000 automatically qualify for
zero EFC.
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at line Z′ beyond which a student receives no additional aid. Therefore, optimal choices
are at points C and D along line Z′. Lines Y and Y′ move in tandem and whether optimal
choice is on line Y′ depends whether it is above or below the maximum award constraint
Z′.
Lastly, relative to grants, the allocation of state appropriations and their effect on
student budget constraints are quite straightforward. Since appropriations are allocated to
institutions, student income or ability obviously do not affect amounts directly.
Appropriations are a lump-sum subsidy based on enrollment and all students who attend
an in-state public institution are beneficiaries. Figure 3.2 already demonstrated the effect
of appropriations on student budget constraints relative to other institution types.
Regardless of the type of institutions for which grant funds can be applied, in-state public
institutions have the outward-most budget constraints due to the additional reduction of l
assuming its value is positive. The marginal change in the per-unit price of e and b with
respect to l is equal to 1, and the change in quantity demanded depends on the marginal
change of 𝑃𝑈 with respect to price.

COMPOSITIONAL CHANGE IN SUBSIDIES
As the previous section demonstrates, state government has numerous options to modify
its subsidy programs for higher education, any of which fundamentally involve a change
in level or composition. The overall increase or decline in state subsidies in higher
education is an important policy issue that impacts how much students must personally
pay for college as well as how institutions must fund themselves. The composition of
state funds across different subsidy types, on the other hand, involves which students
receive public funding and represents a policy decision to target public funds to a
subpopulation of students on the basis of income or ability rather than a more egalitarian
basis. The previous section examined how levels of each subsidy may affect student
demand on a theoretical basis, but there are additional dynamics to consider regarding
changes in subsidy composition, especially those that reflect actual trends.
Chapter 2 made clear that the dominant trend in state financing of higher
education—in terms of how total funds are allocated across different types of subsidy—
follows the high-tuition, high-aid (HTHA) model. Particularly during times of economic
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stress, states decrease appropriations while largely maintaining or even increasing state
grant aid. Moreover, these compositional changes tend to stick. Appropriations do not
recover to pre-recession levels quickly if at all and grants appear more difficult to reduce
once citizens have been entitled to them.
Let us now examine the potential impacts of an HTHA compositional change in
state subsidies on student demand between e and b. It is assumed that the primary goal of
a state that implements an HTHA policy is to reduce total spending on higher education
by reducing appropriations while a proportion of the reduction may be reallocated to
need- and/or merit-based grants. Let t denote the per-student amount subtracted from
appropriations, v denotes the amount of t reallocated toward need-based grants, and w the
amount of t reallocated toward merit-based grants. Together, v and w comprise the total
replacement r, all of which can be described by the following equations
𝑤=

𝑣=
where it must be the case that

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

𝑡

𝑡

(17)

𝑟 =𝑤+𝑣

0≤𝑟≤𝑆

𝑆

𝑛 +𝑆𝑚

𝑡

(18)

to ensure the state spends less on higher education after the HTHA policy. The postHTHA expenditure given an optimal quantity of e and b for each type of institution is
now
𝑃′𝑂 = 𝑝𝑐 (𝑒 ∗ + 𝑏 ∗ )

𝑃′𝑅 = [𝑝𝑐 − (𝑚 + 𝑤)](𝑒 ∗ + 𝑏 ∗ )

(19)

𝑃′𝑈 = [𝑝𝑐 − (𝑙 − 𝑡) − (𝑚 + 𝑤) − (𝑛 + 𝑣)](𝑒 ∗ + 𝑏 ∗ )

In other words, r is the total amount of funds a student receives in return for the reduction
in appropriations. 15

Also note that HTHA potentially increases the price only of in-

state public schools, while the price of in-state private schools potentially decreases.

15

It is assumed students/families do not receive additional income via lower state taxes allowed by the
reduction in appropriations. Since HTHA is typically an attempt to balance the budget in times of fiscal
stress, it seems fair to assume state taxes are not a serious omission in demonstrating impacts on demand, at
least in the short-run.
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If 𝑟 = 𝑡, then eligible students receive an amount of grant aid equal to the amount

lost in appropriations (𝑃𝑅 = 𝑃′𝑅 and 𝑃𝑈 = 𝑃′𝑈 for all 𝑆𝑛 and 𝑆𝑚 ). However, another

trend made clear in Chapter 2 is that the average increase in grant aid has not kept pace
with the average decrease in appropriations. Therefore, it is likely that r is strictly less
than its upper-bound in (18) and that 𝑟 < 𝑡 for a majority of students. Clearly, as r varies,

so too do the effects of HTHA on student demand. Moreover, because w and v are not
necessarily equal or change in proportion, and receipt of financial aid depends on student
income and ability, effects can vary for any given value of r depending on the relation
between v and w, as well as the ratio of total students to students eligible for each grant
type.
A few basic conclusions can be reached regarding state grant funding limitations
according to the general HTHA case described by (17)-(19). First, in order for all eligible
students to receive an amount of grant aid greater than or equal to the amount lost in
appropriations (𝑟 ≥ 𝑡), then 𝑆𝑛 + 𝑆𝑚 ≤ 𝑆. Therefore, the value of r relative to t is a

policy decision that involves not only the proportion reallocated to grants but also the
eligibility criteria that determines the size of recipient groups. If a state structures its
grant programs such that 𝑆𝑛 + 𝑆𝑚 > 𝑆, then only for those eligible to receive both types
of grant aid is it possible for 𝑟 ≥ 𝑡. For all remaining students, the result is an increase in

the price of in-state public higher education. If a state is concerned with achieving a
particular value of r, it seems unlikely without strategically linking decisions between
appropriations and grant aid policy.
It is assumed that 𝑆𝑛 ≠ 𝑆𝑚 , though it may possible for a state to structure its

eligibility criteria so that the two are equal. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely the
distribution of student ability and income would result in the two subsets being equal.
Given the two subsets of students do not perfectly overlap, in order for all eligible
students to receive an amount of financial aid greater than or equal to the amount lost in
appropriations, then it must be the case that v = t and w = t, and thus

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

=

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

= 1.

However, this would exceed the upper-bound of r in (18) if, say, 𝑆𝑛 + 𝑆𝑚 = 𝑆.
Substituting (17) into (18) and algebraic rearrangement shows that it must be the case that
𝑡≤𝑆

𝑆

𝑛 +𝑆𝑚

for all eligible students to receive aid greater than or equal to their loss in
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appropriations. More generally and regardless of a particular goal for r, it must be the
case that
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

𝑆𝑛 +

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

𝑆𝑚 ≤ 𝑆

(20)

in order for a state not to exceed the upper-bound of r, increasing its expenditures
compared to before the HTHA policy.
Values of w and v are not necessarily equal across all eligible students. They
depend on the mechanisms through which a state chooses to alter its grant programs
described by (8) and (11). For merit-based grants, a state can increase funding via the
maximum award, the minimum ability threshold, or the rate at which the award increases
in ability above the minimum threshold. Raising the maximum award increases the
amount of merit aid received only for those who were above the maximum. Increasing
the rate at which the award is increasing in ability does not change the number of eligible
students but increases the amount received by each eligible student who was below the
maximum. Lowering the minimum ability threshold increases the amount received by all
eligible students not already above the maximum award and increases the number of
eligible students. However, let us assume state government does not consider lowering 𝑎

since doing so redefines the subset of students deserving of merit aid. Incorporating these
conditions into the top equation of (17) results in the following equation for w

𝑤=

⎧
⎪

𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕

⎨�𝑎 − 𝑎� �
⎪
⎩

𝑡 𝑖𝑖 𝑎 +

𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝑚
𝑡�
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝑡�
�𝑐𝑚 +
𝜕𝜕

�𝑚+

<𝑎

𝑡� 𝑖𝑖 𝑎 < 𝑎 < 𝑎 +
0 𝑖𝑖 𝑎 < 𝑎

𝜕𝑚
𝑡�
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝑡�
�𝑐𝑚 +
𝜕𝜕

(21)

�𝑚+

which reflects the increase in merit aid equal to the increase in the maximum award if
student ability remains above the new maximum award, the increase in merit aid equal to
the product of ability above the minimum and change in the rate of increase if student
ability remains between the minimum ability and maximum award, and no increase in
merit aid if student ability remains below the minimum ability threshold. Equation (21)
makes clear that in order for w to equal t for all 𝑆𝑚 then

𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕

and

𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕

must equal 1 as long

as there are students with ability that earns above the maximum award. Also, it is
important to note that based on (21) 𝑆𝑚 does not increase.
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The only way a state can modify its need-based grant directly according to (11) is
through the maximum award. As a result of raising the maximum award, it is possible for
eligible students to receive more funding. However, HTHA policy potentially affects the
amount of aid received as well as the number of eligible students through changes in 𝑝𝑐 .
It is also worth noting that EFC remains constant as income is unaffected by the policy.

Therefore, the final value of v depends on the interaction between the maximum award
and any change in 𝑝𝑐 external of need-based aid. Incorporating these conditions into the
second equation in (17) results in the following equation for v
𝜕𝑛

where

𝜕𝑛

𝜕𝑃𝑈

𝑡 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕 𝑡 < 𝑃𝑈 + 𝜕𝜕 𝑡
⎧
𝜕𝜕
⎪
𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝑛
𝑣 = 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 𝑃𝑈 +
𝑡 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛 + 𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑤 < 𝑡
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
⎨
𝑈
𝜕𝑃
⎪
0 𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑈 +
𝑡 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸
⎩
𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕

(22)

> 0 if 𝑤 < 𝑡 and vice versa. 16 Equation (22) reflects the increase in need aid

equal to the increase in the maximum award if total expenditure remains above the sum

of EFC and the maximum award, the increase in need aid equal to the change in price if
expenditures remain between EFC and EFC plus the new maximum award, or no aid if
expenditures remain below EFC.
For those with expenditures between EFC and the sum of EFC and the maximum
award, need-based grant aid operates in a way such that 𝑝𝑐 does not change; 𝑣 = 𝑡 − 𝑤,

thus 𝑃𝑈 does not change. For those with expenditures above the maximum award, need-

based aid does not have this same automatic feature. In order for v to equal t for this
subset it must be the case that

𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕

= 1. 17

The bottom condition in (22) pertains to changes in 𝑆𝑛 . Since any reduction in

state spending through t is partially offset by an amount equal to the product of

𝑈
16 𝜕𝑃

𝜕𝜕

=

𝜕𝑝𝑐
𝜕𝜕

𝑤 = 𝑡, then

𝑡(𝑒∗ + 𝑏∗ ) and

𝜕𝑃

𝑈

𝜕𝜕

= 0.

𝜕𝑝𝑐
𝜕𝜕

=1−

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

. Unless

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

= 1 ≡ 𝑤 = 𝑡 from (30),

𝜕𝑛

𝜕𝑝𝑐
𝜕𝜕

> 0, thus

𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕

and

> 0. If

Technically
= 1 − 𝑤 but it is assumed states cannot target the maximum award to each individual
𝜕𝜕
based on what they receive via changes to merit-based grants. If merit-based grants were factored into
COA, changes in merit aid would be internalized into the amount of need aid awarded.
17
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𝑆𝑛 , the change in 𝑆𝑛 is important in determining whether condition (20) is met. 18 To
reiterate, a student is ineligible for a need-based grant if 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸. Since expenditures

increase as a result of t, this inequality will reverse for a subset of students with
expenditures near their EFC. Specifically, the increase in 𝑆𝑛 is equal to
∑𝑆𝑖=1

𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑈
𝜕𝜕

> 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑈

(23)

or the sum of students whose change in expenditures is greater than the amount to which
their EFC exceeded their original expenditure.
IMPACT OF HTHA ACROSS STUDENTS SUBSETS
Having examined how values of v and w vary with respect to t depending on the
grant program mechanisms a state may or may not modify, all potential subsets of
students from the population S can now be described in terms of the impact HTHA has on
the price of college as well as how prices compare across subsets post-policy. For each
type of grant a student belongs to one of three groups: ineligible, which is denoted with
superscript c in accordance with standard set theory notation, eligible, and eligible but at
the maximum award amount. Thus, there are nine subsets potentially affected by a
compositional change in state subsidies.
Table 3.1 presents each student subset and the impact of HTHA on the per-unit
price 𝑝𝑐 leaving implicit the subsidy values for l, m, and n that were already in effect

prior to the policy. The first two subsets represent the least variable and arguably the
most probable of HTHA outcomes in terms of price changes. There is a subset comprised
𝑐
∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 —and a subset
of students who are ineligible for both types of grants—𝑆𝑚

comprised of students who are ineligible for merit-based aid and eligible for need-based

𝑐
𝑐
aid below the maximum award—𝑆𝑚
∩ 𝑆𝑛 . For 𝑆𝑚
∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 the price increase of 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 is

greater than or equal to any other subset of students. Provided a state does not cap its total
𝑐
funding for need-based grants, there is no change in 𝑝𝑐 for 𝑆𝑚
∩ 𝑆𝑛 .

The third and fourth rows include the only two subsets of students for whom the

in-state public price cannot increase. If their merit-based aid is not sufficient to offset the
18

A state reduces the extent to which savings are offset if total funding for need-based grants is capped,
providing no grant for students who apply once funding has been exhausted. As mentioned in Chapter 2,
only 24 percent of need-based grant programs funded all eligible students in 2016.
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increase of t (

𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕

or

𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕

< 1), need-based aid offsets the remaining amount. If the

increase in merit-based aid is greater than t, the price decreases. The direction of the price
change for the remaining subsets is indeterminate and depends on the value of the
relevant components of w and v relative to t. Among these remaining groups a few
relational conclusions can be made regarding their post-HTHA prices. The price faced by
𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 is necessarily less than or equal to the price faced by 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 due to the

common merit subsidy and the former’s additional need-based subsidy. Similarly, the
price change for 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 must be less than or equal to the price change experienced by

𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 .

The third column of table 3.1 compares the in-state private price change for each

subset. Prices cannot increase for any subset and can potentially decrease for all but three
subsets ineligible for merit-based aid. The private price change is invariably less than the

Table 3.1 - Impact of HTHA on Prices Across Student Subsets

Subset
𝑐
𝑆𝑚
∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

𝑐
𝑆𝑚
∩ 𝑆𝑛

𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛

𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛

𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛
𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐

𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐
𝑐
𝑆𝑚
∩ 𝑆𝑛

𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛

Price Change
In-state Public
In-state Private
𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡
𝑝𝑐
𝜕𝜕

𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝜕𝜕 𝑡
𝑝𝑐 + �𝑡 −
𝑝𝑐 + �𝑡 −

𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕

𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 −

𝜕𝑚

𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 −

𝜕𝑚

𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 −

𝜕𝑐𝑚

𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝑐𝑚

𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 −

𝜕𝑛

𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕

𝑡� − 𝜕𝜕 𝑡

𝑡−

𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 −

𝜕𝜕

𝑡� − 𝜕𝜕 𝑡
𝜕𝑛

𝑡

𝜕𝜕

𝑡

𝑡

𝑡

𝑡−
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𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕

𝑡

𝑝𝑐

𝑝𝑐 −

𝜕𝑐𝑚

𝑝𝑐 −

𝜕𝑚

𝑝𝑐 −

𝜕𝑚

𝑝𝑐 −

𝜕𝑐𝑚

𝜕𝜕

𝑝𝑐 −

𝜕𝑚

𝑝𝑐 −

𝜕𝑐𝑚

𝑝𝑐

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕

𝜕𝜕

𝑡

𝑡
𝑡

𝑡

𝑡

𝑡

public price change for subsets 1, 6, and 7. It should be noted these results are contingent
on the assumption that merit-based aid can be applied to in-state private schools. Also,
comparing per-unit price changes across public and private institutions only relates to the
change in price differential; public institutions still have a lower per-unit price due to
remaining state appropriations and the amount of need-based aid that are not applicable
to private institutions.
Combinations of student subsets and potential HTHA policy variations are
numerous, but a few scenarios can be explored that highlight the boundaries of HTHA
policy and its impact on the market. A realistic lower-bound might involve a case in
which a state reduces appropriations and does nothing to increase funding through grants
other than provide that which is needed for the automatic increase in need-based aid
among those eligible and below the maximum award. An upper-bound might involve a
case in which the state commits to providing every eligible student an increase in grant
aid that is no less than the reduction in appropriations. 19 Assuming no subsets overlap
perfectly, the upper-bound policy requires w and v to equal t through all grant program
mechanisms.
For the lower-bound case in which appropriations are reduced and only additional
need aid for those below the maximum is provided, the nine subsets in table 3.1 collapse
to two in terms of those that experience a price change. The three subsets eligible for
need-based aid and below the maximum award (2, 3, and 4) experience no price change.
The remaining subsets experience a price increase equal to t. Though there are only two
price changes, the quantities demanded of e and b still vary across different subsets based
on the levels of ability and income that determine their particular subset.
Figure 3.4 shows the impact of this lower-bound HTHA policy on four
hypothetical students within different subsets. Student A is ineligible for merit-based aid
and is above the maximum need-based award. The budget constraint for this student
reduces by t and optimal choice is now at point A′. The student at point B has equal
ability as student A but is eligible for additional need-based aid due to her total
expenditure toward college relative to her EFC. The budget constraint is unaffected and

19

A precise upper-bound for r such as that stated in (27) is indeterminate thus far. It requires knowing the
number of eligible students who actually receive aid based on institutional choice.
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optimal choice remains at point B. Student C has equivalent income as student B but has
higher ability that makes him eligible for merit-based aid. Therefore, student C’s budget
constraint is higher than B by the amount of his merit award and experiences no change
in price. Lastly, Student D has higher ability and income than all other students such that
she is eligible for merit-based aid (whether at the maximum or not is inconsequential) and
ineligible for need-based aid. Like student A, the budget constraint for student D reduces
by t and optimal choice is now at point D′.
This example illustrates that there are two groups in terms of pre- and post-HTHA
prices—those for whom the per-unit price increased and those for whom it did not
change—but also two student types within the group that experienced the increase in
price—a lower-ability, lower-income student and a higher-ability, higher-income student.
By virtue of their characteristics, the two students’ demand for quantities of e and b
respond differently to the same change in price. If preferences are homothetic (i.e. linear
IEPs from the origin), then the decline in demand for b is greater for student A than D,
and the decline in demand for e is greater for student D than A.

Figure 3.4 - Effect of a Lower-Bound HTHA Policy

48

This lower-bound HTHA case reduces to increasing the price for some students
and not for others on the basis of income or rather their ability to pay for the quantity of
higher education they would optimally consume. Obviously, this results in a decrease in
market demand provided there is some elasticity in demand, but does it result in a
divergence in the quantity of educational resources demanded relative to amenities, as
was stated at the beginning of the chapter? In this specific example it does because of
student D’s location on the graph relative to student A’s, which was arbitrarily chosen
except for the parameter that student D must have greater demand for e than student A.
The extent to which demand differs between the two students depends on the values of
𝜕2 𝑢

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

and

𝜕2 𝑢

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

, and whether an increase in the per-unit price equal to t results in a

divergence in demand depends on

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

for student D relative to

𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕

for student A. Only in

the event that the two are equal does the ratio of demand for e to b remain the same after
the HTHA policy. Thus, it is likely that the lower-bound HTHA results in a divergence.
However, whether demand for educational resources relative to amenities is higher or
lower is indeterminant. Furthermore, the magnitude of this divergence in the state market
depends on the sizes of the subsets involved (1 and 5-9).
In the upper-bound HTHA case where a state commits to providing an increase in
grant aid for all eligible students by an amount no less than the reduction in
appropriations, the nine subsets of students in table 3.1 collapse to three in terms of a
change in price. Subset 1 which is ineligible for both types of aid experiences an increase
in price equal to t. The two subsets eligible for both types of aid and above the maximum
need award (subsets 5 and 9) actually experience a decrease in price equal to t. Again,
this result follows from the assumption that merit-based aid does not displace need-based
aid on the basis of ability to pay (i.e. EFC). Therefore, these students receive both the
increase in merit-based aid via the maximum award or multiplier and the increase in the
maximum need award. Unless a state can identify students in these specific financial
situations, the higher-ability, lower- or higher-income students that comprise these two
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subsets benefit from this particular HTHA policy. 20 The remaining subsets experience no
price change.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the impact of this upper-bound HTHA policy on three
hypothetical students belonging to different subsets. The high-ability, low-income of
student A places him in the subset of students beyond the maximum of merit- and needbased aid. The unit price for student A decreases by t and optimal choice is now at point
A′. Student B belongs to the subset eligible for both types of aid below the maximum
award, and thus experiences no price change. Lastly, the low-ability, high-income of
student C places him in the subset of students who are ineligible for both types of aid.
Therefore, the unit price increases by t and optimal choice shifts to point C′.
Unlike the lower-bound case, the upper-bound case involves a price increase and
decrease across fewer student subsets, resulting in a more determinable effect. The two
subsets that experience a decrease in price have higher-ability and lower income than the
subset that experiences an increase in price. This policy scenario results in a divergence
Figure 3.5 - Effect of Upper-Bound HTHA Policy

20

Though it is likely that students above the maximum of need-based award primarily includes lowerincome students, without a cap on the EFC eligible for need-based aid, a higher-income student could
spend enough on college to exceed the maximum award.
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in demand e and b among the subsets involved, specifically an increase in the ratio of
educational resources-to-amenities. Again, the magnitude of this divergence in the state
higher education market depends on the sizes of the student subsets.
For any subset in table 3.1 that experiences an increase in price, the price
differential between in-state and out-of-state decreases. Shifting funds from
appropriations to grants necessarily raises the in-state public price for students who are
ineligible for grant aid. Describing this subset of students in terms of ability and income
depends on the grant policy of a state. If a state has both need- and merit-based grants,
these students are lower-ability and middle-to-higher-income compared to other students
in the state. Consequently, these students have a higher demand for amenities and lower
demand for educational resources than their peers. In other words, an HTHA
compositional change decreases the financial incentive for this ineligible subset to remain
in state. At the same time, public institutions in other states implementing HTHA policy
have a financial incentive to attract more nonresident students in response to a decline in
appropriations. Therefore, under certain circumstances HTHA policy can generate a
positive feedback loop where states cross-haul their grant ineligible students who on
average demand greater amenities. This suggests that the dominant trend in state
financing of higher education may explain the disproportional increase in amenities
among public postsecondary institutions.
INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS AND DEMAND PRESSURE
Thus far, latent demand for college goods categorized by consumption amenity or
educational resource has been the primary focus. Though these goods can be considered
continuously distributed across the entire higher education market, the institutions that
comprise the market supply these goods in somewhat discreet bundles. 21 A student
cannot marginally increase or decrease e or b as demonstrated above unless there exists
21

Even within discreet institutions amenities and educational resources can vary in a continuous fashion. In
some cases, amenities are voluntary add-ons to attending college, such as dormitories and meal plans, both
of which can offer variable pricing based on quantity. Though the quality of academic programs varies
within institutions according to their educational resources, prices are mostly constant with the exception of
mandatory fees that may be associated with a particular program. Variable educational resources are
increasingly attached to variable pricing as institutions experiment with academic program-specific pricing.
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an institution that supplies a marginally greater or lesser quantity of e or b. Inference
regarding student demand for educational resources and amenities ultimately relies on
observing college choice presented by equation (1). The array of institutions available for
students choose determines many of the consequences of a compositional change in
subsidies at the state level.
Holding the quantity of e and b supplied by an institution constant, the changes in
price due to subsidies affect �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖 � in (1). Table 3.1 summarizes how HTHA can

impact the probability students choose to attend one of the three types of institutions. Any
increase in price lowers the likelihood a student within the affected subset attends an instate public or private institution and increases the likelihood of attending an out-of-state
option or no college. The allocative decision a state makes across subsidies determines
which subsets are affected, and in turn, determines whether demand for e relative to b is
altered.
Intuitively, the probability that a student chooses to attend a particular institution
is represented by its proximity to the student’s optimal choice within the two-good space
examined in the previous figures. One could imagine all postsecondary institutions placed
in the figures above according to their quantities of e and b, providing a virtual
continuum of options that make marginal changes in demand possible. A vast majority of
these institutions are outside of students’ home state, though, and are systematically more
expensive per-unit due to various state subsidies, all else equal. Since a greater quantity
of college goods can be consumed with in-state subsidies, it is likely that an in-state
institution allows students to reach the greatest level of utility. Nevertheless, depending
on the supply of in-state institutions, the number of feasible choices of e and b can be
rather limited. This not only limits students’ probability of maximizing utility with an instate institution, but also limits the extent to which state subsidies can drive a divergence
in demand within a state. 22 If a state had only one institution, any divergence in demand

would operate entirely across state borders, with subsets of students being more or less
likely to attend in-state, but with no sorting possible across institutions within the state.
22

In a state like Wyoming where there is only one public 4-year institution, any effect on latent demand
due to a compositional change in subsidies would be difficult to detect empirically through college choice.
Coincidentally, states such as Wyoming, Montana, and Utah with limited institutional competition are
among the states that allocate the greatest proportion of subsidies to appropriations.
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Figure 3.6 illustrates this conceptualization of college choice within the context
of the demand model presented thus far using the upper-bound HTHA policy among four
students within the same state. The various budget constraints do not exhaust income and
correspond with the per-unit price conditional on type of institution, grant eligibility, and
consumption of other goods. The dashed constraints represent price changes from the
HTHA policy. The no college option is represented by point 1 at the origin in which case
only other goods are consumed. Public institutions are represented by points 2, 3, and 4,
distributed in a way to reflect a state that has a low-educational, low-amenity option
(point 2), a middle-educational, high-amenity option (point 3), and high-educational,
middle-amenity option (point 4). In-state private options are represented by points 4 and
5, distributed in a way to reflect a state that has a middle-educational, low-amenity option
(point 4) and an elite-educational, high-amenity option (point 5).
The top panel of figure 3.6 includes student A who belongs to the 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 subset

𝑐
and student B who belongs to the 𝑆𝑚
∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 subset. For student A, the increase in both

types of aid to offset the reduction in appropriations results in options 4 and 5 now being
below the student’s optimal share of income allocated toward college. Without the
increase in aid, attending option 4 or 5 would require suboptimal consumption,
particularly the substitution of other goods for e and b. The increase in aid allows greater
numeraire consumption while attending the institution that was most proximate to
optimal consumption prior to the policy change. Given the proximity of the out-of-state

constraint to the origin it is unlikely that a better option exists outside of options 4 and 5.
Option 4 is utility maximizing in terms of e and b, and thus would be assigned the highest
probability of attendance. For student B, option 3 is now above the optimal share of
income allocated toward college due to the reduction in appropriations. As a result, the
probability of attending option 3 is reduced. The only other feasible in-state option is
option 2. Surely there is an out-of-state option that would provide greater utility than
option 2. In this scenario the reduction in appropriations has increased the likelihood that
student B attends college out-of-state.
The bottom panel of figure 3.6 includes student C who belongs to subset 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐

𝑐
and student D who belongs to the same subset as student B—𝑆𝑚
∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 —but has a higher

income. Student C experiences no price change but the in-state options do not match well
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Figure 3.6 - Impact of HTHA on College Choice
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with her optimal choices. Option 6 is not academically feasible, leaving options 4 and 5
as providing the greatest utility among in-state options. It is likely an out-of-state option
exists that would offer greater utility than the in-state options. This case highlights how
merit-aid, despite reducing the per-unit price of in-state options, can be ineffective at
retaining high-ability students within the state if there are not suitable institutions for
eligible students. Student D experiences an increase in price for public options, reducing
numeraire consumption if an in-state option is chosen but not significantly impacting his
choice set. As is the case with higher-income students, there is likely an out-of-state
option that best matches student D’s optimal choice of e and b. The HTHA policy
increases the probability student D chooses an out-of-state institution and lowers the
probability of choosing option 3.
Generalizing from these examples, a few insights can be reached regarding the
expected impact of state subsidy composition on college access and choice. In doing so, it
is assumed that for any student whose unsubsidized optimal choice of e and b is positive,
there is an out-of-state institution that most closely matches their optimal choice. Thus,
the reason approximately 80 percent of students attend in-state institutions is largely due
to state subsidies as well as the monetary and non-monetary costs associated with
distance.
The effect of state subsidies on college access and choice can operate in two
distinct ways depending on the relationship between student demand and available instate options: 1) state subsidies make an in-state institution available that is otherwise
unavailable, or 2) state subsidies lower the price of attending an available in-state
institution but does not result in any new options. In the first case, state subsidies are
expected to substantially increase the probability that an in-state institution is chosen.
Furthermore, the likelihood that state subsidies have this effect is decreasing in student
income and increasing in student ability, all else equal. In other words, the number of instate public or private institutions already available to students is increasing in income, in
turn, making it less likely that state subsidies result in a new option. State subsidies
cannot result in new options if remaining institutions are not academically feasible. 23

23

On the supply-side, institutions may be incentivized to decrease admissions standards for such students.
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In the second case, the effect of subsidies is expected to be less pronounced. Each
additional dollar in subsidies increases numeraire consumption if the available in-state
institution is chosen. Therefore, the effect of the subsidy on the probability that a student
chooses the available institution is a function of his marginal rate of substitution of the
sum of e and b supplied by the institution for income. Given a diminishing return to
income, the marginal effect of state subsidies on college choice is decreasing in income if
the subsidies do not result in new options. Moreover, the likelihood that state subsidies do
not result in new options is increasing in income and decreasing in ability.
Overall, compositional subsidy changes that target lower-income, higher-ability
students are expected to have the greatest marginal impact on in-state access and choice
among public institutions as well as in-state private institutions if grant aid can be applied
to them, all else equal. This would seem to be the motivation for states employing mixed
grant programs. Given a positive correlation between income and ability (Strenze, 2007),
merit-based grants seem to be poorly designed by comparison insofar as they provide
subsidies to high-income, high-ability students whose institutional choices are least likely
to be affected. Furthermore, if demand for amenities is increasing in income, and if it is
deemed undesirable for public funds to contribute to the consumption of amenities rather
than educational resources, then merit-based grants seem poorly designed in this respect
as well.
Need-based grants are poorly designed by comparison insofar as they provide
subsidies to low-ability students for whom new options are academically infeasible.
However, as long as at least one institution is academically feasible, increasing the
maximum need-based award increases the probability an eligible student attends college
as opposed to no college until the award reaches the COA of the institution. If higherincome students are eligible for need-based grants due to no cap on EFC, then it is likely
that such funds disproportionately contribute to the consumption of amenities, which may
or may not be a desirable outcome.
Lastly, student demand for e and b is not only relevant in the context of college
choice but throughout a student’s time spent pursuing a college degree at an institution.
As figure 3.6 illustrates, observing a student’s choice of institution does not necessarily
mean that institution supplies optimal quantities of e and b at the time of matriculation or
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while the student is enrolled. Students spend several years at one or more institutions that
match their optimal quantities of e and b to varying extents and have numerous
opportunities to impose demand pressures on the institution they attend. Such pressure
can include leaving an institution in the extreme case but also through daily usage of
institutional resources, feedback on evaluation surveys, or advocacy and voting through
shared governance mechanisms. Consideration of student demand in the manner
presented above can help explain institutional supply beyond that which is aimed at
competing for new students, namely their efforts to satisfy currently enrolled students.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter presented a theoretical model of student demand for college using a
two-attribute conceptualization of college quality and heterogenous demand for those
attributes along dimensions of student ability and income. State governments’ allocative
decisions across subsidy types fundamentally involve whether to target public funds
based on these same student dimensions. Therefore, the mechanisms through which a
state can modify its subsidies and alter prices for separate groups of students were also
examined. The interaction between targeted price changes and heterogeneous demand for
educational resources and amenities offers insights into the differential impacts of state
subsidy composition in the higher education market that have not been thoroughly
explored by scholars or considered by policymakers. The opportunity for research on the
topics addressed in this chapter is substantial.
Fundamental questions remain regarding the multi-attribute conceptualization of
postsecondary institutions. Estimating the relationship between every observable resource
within institutions and students’ enrollment choices is fairly straightforward but does
little to advance our understanding of student or social welfare without properly
characterizing these resources as an educational or consumption attribute. Evidence that
students are more likely to attend an institution with high investment in a student center
and state subsidy policy increases market demand for such resources is limited in its
ability to provide policy recommendations unless we know what a student center actually
represents economically. This categorization of college resources according to the
economic investment they represent is itself a significant empirical task.
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Moreover, it is unlikely that resources fall squarely into a single attribute or even
that two attributes sufficiently characterize all institutional resources. Defining
educational resources as anything that contributes to the value of a degree or increases
labor market returns has sound economic footing within the human capital framework,
but research is limited as to what underlying resources contribute to the value of a degree.
Defining amenities as everything else that does not add value to a degree is exhaustive
but possibly too rudimentary. At least some amenities presumably contribute toward
student success even if success is narrowly defined as completing a degree. For instance,
investment in student health services may not add value to a degree but may increase the
likelihood a student realizes the value of said degree. Separating amenities further into
those that increase the likelihood of degree completion may be necessary before policy
recommendations can be made regarding public investment in higher education and
student demand.
The role of the academic constraint in student demand for non-educational
attributes could be the focus of further study. As was mentioned in the beginning of this
chapter, it is not clear a priori why higher-income students would receive greater
marginal return to amenities, all else equal. What empirical work exists suggests this is
the case (Jacob et al., 2018). This finding could be due to the characterization of
amenities just discussed. Perhaps demand for resources that increase the likelihood of
success is increasing in income, which seems more intuitive than the claim that returns to
a lazy river or climbing wall are increasing in income. Alternatively, research is fairly
consistent in finding that low-income students are less likely to apply to institutions of
academic quality that matches their ability (Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009;
Hoxby & Avery, 2012; Hoxby & Turner, 2013). If higher-income students are more
likely to reach a binding academic constraint, beyond which income can only be allocated
toward amenities, then it would appear that demand for amenities is increasing in income.
Which of these is the dominant explanation has implications for the investment incentives
institutions face in a competitive market.
Regarding research on state subsidies in higher education, the above analysis
highlights the need for detailed data at the student and state levels, first and foremost.
One would need measures of student income and ability as well as comprehensive state
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grant program information to adequately estimate effects of subsidy composition across
the various student subsets according to their grant eligibility. Student-level income data
is typically obtained by states once a student has completed the FAFSA, which introduces
significant selection bias into inference pertaining to college-going behavior among a
state’s high school graduates. Nationally representative longitudinal surveys contain
student-level data for cohorts of high school graduates but have relatively small sample
sizes that are not appropriate to use for state-level analysis. 24 One would need to develop
a procedure to normalize the various state subsidy features in order to generalize analysis
to the national level. Furthermore, the detail necessary of state grant programs is not
systematically collected or archived over time.
Available data does make state-level analysis of subsidy composition possible,
much like the work done by Toutkoushian and Hillman (2012), but this masks specific
effects on student subsets and can lead to fairly ambiguous policy implications. For
example, in their 20-year panel of state subsidy and college enrollment, Toutkoushian
and Hillman do not find evidence that the proportion of state subsidies allocated to needbased aid affects in-state or out-of-state enrollment. This could suggest need-based aid is
ineffective due to targeting students who are least likely to enroll in college.
Alternatively, such a result could indicate that need-based aid is effective at offsetting
price changes from other subsidies among eligible students. Without information on the
underlying mechanics of subsidy distribution, confidence regarding the effects of subsidy
composition is limited.
Using the theory presented in this chapter and the empirical evidence provided by
future research, a more informed state strategy with respect to subsidy composition in
higher education can begin to materialize. State objectives concerning subsidies in higher
education can vary, including the maximization of enrollment, educational attainment,
tax revenues, or public benefits. This chapter represents an initial step toward a better
understanding of the student subsets affected by state subsidy composition and their
demand for broad categories of institutional goods and services that likely affect any
objective a state may have.

24

Inability to use NCES national surveys for state-level analysis is a primary motivation for the inaugural
NPSAS 2018 survey which will be representative of all 50 states.

59

Finally, the potential effects of state subsidy composition demonstrated above has
implications for at least two more aspects of the higher education market and are the
focus of the next two chapters: institutional expenditures and college student migration.
Assuming a competitive market in which institutional expenditures are responsive to
student demand, the divergence in demand between educational resources and amenities
driven by state subsidy composition should affect how institutions allocate revenues
across budget categories related to these two attributes. Student migration, or the distance
a student must travel to attend a particular institution, is another potentially important
attribute not considered in this chapter. Given that state subsidies can alter college choice,
they can alter the distances students migrate to attend college. The focus of Chapter 5 is
to estimate the effect of distance on college-going behavior and degree completion as a
way to link state subsidy policy to outcomes that are better understood in terms of their
desirability compared to the uncertain desirability of student demand for educational
resources versus amenities.
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[4]
STATE SUBSIDY COMPOSITION AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPENDITURE DIVERGENCE
The composition of state funding between appropriations, need-based aid, and meritbased aid is an important policy lever states use to alter college prices for all or certain
subsets of students. A multitude of studies examine student enrollment response to
changes in the price of college (see Page & Scott-Clayton, 2016). Far fewer, by
comparison, offer insight into how institutions respond to variation in government
subsidies beyond changes to tuition levels. The previous chapter established the
theoretical expectation that the composition of state subsidies alters the demand for
educational resources relative to amenities. This chapter empirically examines whether
state subsidy composition explains variation in institutional expenditures across budget
categories in a manner that reflects expected changes in student demand.
BACKGROUND
State government is generally the primary source of institutional revenue and
certainly the primary source of public funding. However, as Chapter 2 discussed at
length, state support of higher education has waned over time. Average state funding as a
percent of total educational revenue among postsecondary institutions has declined from
about 70 percent in 1992 to almost 50 percent in 2017, and just this year student tuition
provides a greater percent of revenue than appropriations in a majority of states. Like any
other organization, postsecondary institutions must respond and adapt to changes in their
revenue sources. Broadly, the response to declining state revenues must involve either
increasing tuition, decreasing costs, or both to the extent that alternative revenue sources
are insufficient. 25
Most existing research on institutional response to public funding pertains to
tuition. Somewhat unsurprisingly, state funding and in-state tuition exhibit an inverse
relationship (Koshal & Koshal, 2000). There is also consistent evidence that institutions
raise nonresident tuition or the proportion of nonresident students to recoup revenue lost
from a decline in appropriations (Mixon& Hsing, 1994; Rizzo & Ehrenburg, 2004;
25

Institutions may find alternative revenue sources to replace declining appropriations, such as research or
philanthropy. Newfield (2016) provides strong arguments that institutions have pursued revenues via
research and philanthropy, while neither are promising substitutions for appropriations.
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Jaquette & Curs, 2015), resulting in crowding-out of low-income students (Jaquette,
Curs, & Posselt, 2016) as well as resident students at selective research universities (Curs
& Jaquette, 2017). Recent work finds that for every $1,000 reduction in state
appropriations per student, the average student is predicted to pay an additional $257 per
year using data from 1987 to 2014 and $318 since 2000 (Webber, 2017).
Regarding the relationship between tuition and grant aid, research has primarily
focused on federal sources such as Pell Grants, which is strictly need-based. Evidence
that institutions raise tuition in response to Pell Grants is mixed, ranging from no
evidence of an increase, 17-50 cents per dollar among non-profit institutions, to as high
as 78 cents on the dollar among for-profit institutions (McPherson & Shapiro, 1998;
Singel & Stone, 2007; Cellini & Goldin, 2013; Turner, 2014). Long (2004a) examined
tuition response to the broad state merit-based HOPE scholarship in Georgia and found
evidence of tuition increases of 10 cents per dollar among public institutions and up to 30
cents per dollar among private institutions. 26
Overall, it seems a substantial portion of institutional response to public funding
occurs through expenditures for which there is a significant lack of research. Study of the
relationship between state subsidies and institutional expenditures is seemingly exclusive
to the policy context of performance-based budgeting, which is at best tangential to the
topic of interest in this work. Rabovsky (2012) finds institutions alter budget allocations
between instruction and research in response to a portion of appropriation revenue being
made conditional on student success. This provides at least some evidence that
institutions will respond in ways other than tuition to increase or protect revenues. In the
event a state shifts a sizeable portion of its public funds from appropriations to grant aid,
knowing how institutions might be expected to alter expenditures could be of value to
policymakers.
Finally, one should be careful not to assign private or social value judgments to
institutional expenditures toward broad attributes such as educational resources or
amenities. It is not clear what amenities actually include beyond that which does not
directly contribute to the production of human capital, and we do not have a good
26

It is interesting to note that public institutions raised tuition through room and board fees. As mentioned
in Chapter 3, governmental control over public tuition may incentivize institutions to increase the prices of
opt-in services that are not financed directly by tuition in order to recover lost appropriations revenue.
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understanding of what specific resources within an institution result in greater human
capital. The national narrative surrounding amenities conjures posh dormitories and
resort-like entertainment, but the conceptualization of amenities might also include
services for physical and mental health, cultural enrichment, and extracurricular
involvement. The measurement of institutional expenditures also limits our understanding
of their return on investment, as expenditures are reported across only a few broad
functional categories:

instruction, research, academic support, student services, and

auxiliary enterprises. Research has shown that expenditures on student services have a
greater impact on student persistence and graduation than instruction (Webber &
Ehrenburg, 2010; Webber, 2012). Investment in student services is also associated with
self-reported gains in several academic and soft social skills (Toutkoushian & Smart,
2001).
STATE SUBSIDY COMPOSITION AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPENDITURES
From a broad state policy perspective, the considerations involved in higher
education subsidy composition are not unlike those of vouchers at the K-12 level.
Appropriations are distributed to institutions to subsidize the cost of college, while grants
travel with the student and are received by the institution he or she attends. Arguments
common in the voucher context, such as increased competition and limited mobility
among disadvantaged students, also apply to the higher education context. Features
unique to the higher education market require some unique considerations with respect to
subsidy composition. Grants are awarded on the basis of need and/or merit, the latter of
which disproportionately go to higher-income students. Competitive institutions
(including public) can deny entry on the basis of ability or incorporate the receipt of grant
aid into a student’s tuition or admission. 27
Though there is debate regarding the objective or mission of postsecondary
institutions (e.g. profit, prestige, spending, educational attainment), it seems safe to
assume any institutional objective involves the incentive to increase or preserve revenues,
while the specific strategies employed to do so might vary according to institutional

27

The author recognizes the case can be made that similar features are present at the K-12 level just not as
overtly.
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objective. Setting perverse incentives and strategies in response to the provision of grant
aid aside, there is some degree of institutional competition over students that mirrors the
traditional economic market. Research suggests that the higher education market is
competitive overall, with most institutions possessing limited market power (Epple et al.,
2006).
In theory, state subsidy composition alters the dynamic of institutional
competition. Appropriations are tied to enrollment and so do not incentivize competition
over any specific in-state students. If appropriations decline, public institutional revenues
decline. These institutions can respond to the loss in revenue by decreasing expenditures,
which does not preserve revenues, or increasing tuition. To the extent tuition is increased
in-state enrollment will decline. In order to preserve revenues, institutions must increase
enrollment of out-of-state students or students who receive tuition discounts from state
grants. Therefore, grants incentivize competition over specific subsets of students who
are eligible based on income and/or ability. If student demand for the various types of
resources colleges can provide systematically differ along income or ability, then changes
in state subsidy composition can be expected to affect institutional expenditures.
Chapter 3 demonstrated that as states allocate a greater proportion of their total
subsidies toward merit-based aid, demand increases among students with greater
preference for educational resources compared to those who are ineligible for merit-based
aid whose demand potentially declines. Given a positive correlation between ability and
income though, merit-based aid may also increase demand among those who have greater
preference for amenities if demand for amenities is increasing in income. The effect of
merit-based aid may also depend on the selectivity of the institution. Highly selective
institutions already attract higher-ability students and are likely less financially
constrained when increasing educational resources. Therefore, more selective institutions
are expected to increase expenditures on educational resources. By contrast, if there is a
relationship between demand for amenities and income, less selective institutions may
have a greater incentive to increase expenditures on amenities in response to merit-based
aid.
As states allocate a greater share of their total subsidies toward need-based aid,
demand may increase among lower-income students who may have lower preference for
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amenities than those who are ineligible. This depends on the nature of the increase in
need-based share. If the increase is the result of offsetting the reduction in appropriations,
demand should not change among those who do not reach the maximum award while
demand decreases among those who do. If the increase in need-based share increases as a
result of an increase in the maximum award, then demand among these lower-income
students increases. The expenditure response to need-based aid would be largely
indeterminant if not for the effect it has on those who are ineligible for need-based aid.
Demand among these students declines. Again, given the positive correlation between
income and ability, an increase in the share of need-based aid is expected to
disproportionately decrease demand for educational resources and increase demand for
amenities. The hypothesis follows that an increase in the share of need-based aid will
increase expenditures toward amenities and decrease expenditures toward educational
resources. This effect may also be sensitive to institutional selectivity. An increase in
demand among lower-income students coupled with a decrease in demand among higherincome students may incentivize selective institutions to actually decrease expenditures
toward instruction as well as amenities if their demand is increasing in income. 28 Similar
to merit-based aid, an increase in the share of need-based aid is expected to increase
expenditures toward amenities among less selective institutions given their constraint in
raising educational resources.
In addition to selectivity, effects are expected to differ across the control of the
institution for two primary reasons. First, the ability to apply state grant aid to the cost of
attendance often differs between private and public institutions. A greater proportion of
total subsidies allocated toward grants should have no effect on private expenditure
shares if a state only allows its grant funds to be used at public institutions. Second, state
appropriations are not a source of revenue for private institutions. The tradeoff at the state
level between appropriations and grants does not represent the same tradeoff in revenue
sources for private institutions as it does for public institutions. HTHA-like policies are
likely to be state revenue positive for private institutions if states allow grants to be
applied to them. As demonstrated in chapter 2, though the relationship between

28

Provided there are budget categories related to attributes other than educational resources and amenities.
Otherwise, an institution’s share of expenditures cannot decrease in both of only two categories.
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appropriations and grants is not a perfect zero-sum tradeoff, increases in grants are
generally accompanied by larger declines in appropriations. This overall loss in revenue
among public institutions may manifest in expenditure shares.
DATA
To study the impact of state subsidy composition on institutional expenditures a panel
data set of the IPEDS universe between 1990 and 2015 prepared by The Delta Cost
Project is used. These data were supplemented with additional institutional variables
collected from IPEDS. Information regarding state grant aid and appropriations were
collected from the National Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs
(NASSGAP) and State Higher Education Finance (SHEF), respectively. Additional state
demographic data were collected from the U.S. Census. Institutional finance data were
adjusted using FTE, state finance data were adjusted using age 18-24 state population
estimates, and all financial data were adjusted for cross-time comparison using the 2015
Consumer Price Index.
Institutional selectivity is measured using Barron’s Selectivity Index acquired
through the Equality of Opportunity Project (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan,
2017). Selectivity categories in descending order include the following:

most

competitive, highly competitive, very competitive, competitive, less competitive,
noncompetitive. These were collapsed into two categories: more competitive consisting
of the first three groups, and less competitive consisting of the latter three groups.
Selectivity is available for only public institutions and is time invariant in the data though
selectivity is assumed to be fairly stable over time.
Dependent variables include institutional expenditure toward select operational
categories as a share of total expenditures. Total operational expenditures are measured
as the sum of total educational and general expenditures—a variable consistently reported
in the Delta Cost Project data—and auxiliary enterprise expenditures. Total educational
and general expenditures is equal to the sum of expenditures toward the following
operational categories: instruction, research, public service, academic support, student
services, institutional support, plant operations and maintenance, and grants.29
29

See Appendix for a description of each category.
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Expenditures on grants was subtracted from total expenditures because IPEDS did not
differentiate the source of grants until 2002, thus avoiding a mechanical relationship
between state grants and institutional expenditures.
The expenditure shares of particular interest include those representing
expenditures toward educational quality and amenities. Based on their examination of
financial data and discussions with higher education finance practitioners, Jacob et al.
(2018) conclude that expenditures in instruction and academic support represent
educational quality, while expenditures in student services and auxiliary enterprises
represent amenities. Therefore, the analysis that follows focuses on expenditure shares of
these four categories. The authors present their analysis with these four categories
collapsed into their two respective attributes. Instead, this study analyzes the categories
separately. Though instruction and academic support may be broadly described as
measures of educational quality, they still represent distinctly different goods and
services for which an institution may alter its shares differently in response to changes in
state subsidies. The same rational applies to student services and auxiliary enterprises.
Table 4.1 provides a brief description of the goods and services included in each of the
four categories as well as how each category qualitatively represents spending on either
educational quality or amenities.
The explanatory variables of interest include various measures of state
expenditures on higher education subsidies, particularly the percentage of total subsidies
allocated toward each subsidy type. The percentage of total subsidy allocated toward
grant aid is a measure of the extent to which a state targets its subsidies by income and/or
ability. 30 The data include state appropriations between 1990 and 2015, and two
typologies for grant aid available during different time periods. The first is expenditures
on need-based aid and non-need-based aid between 1990 and 2015. Non-need-based aid
includes programs that are not exclusively based on need, meaning they include a merit
component but may also include a need component. NASSGAP began including an
exclusively merit-based indicator in its data in 1999, enabling one to distinguish between
30

The grant aid percentage variables are not the same as those used in Chapter 3 to represent state subsidy
composition. Percentages are used instead due to there being structural zeros in the data. There is not an
agreed-upon method for dealing with zeros in compositional data that represent a structural absence of a
component (Martin-Fernandez, Palarea-Albaladejo, and Olea, 2011).
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Table 4.1 – Description of Expenditures on Education and Amenities
Category

Description
General academic instruction expenses
such as salaries and wages for all
instructional employees.

Attribute
Education: directly tied to the aim
of increasing human capital
production

Academic
Support

Activities and services that support
instruction, research and public service
such as libraries, academic administration
(e.g. deans), and information technology.

Education: partially tied to human
capital production

Student
Services

Admissions, registrar, student records,
student activities, cultural events, student
newspapers, intramural athletics, and
student organizations.

Amenities: primarily includes
services that facilitate degree
completion, enhance the college
experience, or develop soft skills

Auxiliary
Enterprises

Activities that are revenue generating, such
as residence halls, food services, student
health services, intercollegiate athletics,
college unions, and college stores.

Amenities: primarily includes
consumption goods and services
largely available in the private
sector

Instruction

need-based, mixed, and merit-based aid. The imprecision of non-need aid and mixed aid
as subsidies distributed on the basis of income versus ability presents challenges for
interpreting their effects in relation to the theoretical expectations previously discussed.
These will be addressed as they arise.
The sample of institutions included in the Delta Cost Project data was refined in a
few ways to obtain the analytic sample. Only non-profit public and private four-year
institutions classified as baccalaureate colleges or above are included. Special focus (e.g.
theology, medical, teachers), for-profit, and two-year institutions are considered too
heterogeneous in mission, student body, and interaction with state subsidies to include in
the sample. Institutions that opened or closed between 1990 and 2015 as well as those
missing data in any year for all expenditure categories of interest or total expenditures are
excluded. Institutions for which state subsidy data were unavailable are excluded. Lastly,
institutions in the bottom one percentile of panel-wide average undergraduate enrollment
or those that were recorded as having zero undergraduates in any year are excluded. The
analytic sample includes a total of 1,059 institutions across 47 states and 26 years.
Table 4.2 displays summary statistics including overall mean, minimum, and
maximum as well as the within-institution or state standard deviation. The top panel
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Table 4.2 - Summary Statistics
Variable
Expenditure Shares
Instruction
Academic Support
Student Services
Auxiliary
Grant Aid Percentages
Need
Non-need
Mixed
Merit
Institution Controls
FTE (1000s)
Undergrad
Public
Selective
State Controls
Med. Inc (1000s)
Poverty Rate
Unemployment
Pct. White
Observations
Institutions
States
Years

Mean

SD

Min

Max

35.89
8.41
10.78
15.34

3.48
2.10
2.50
3.15

2.19
0.05
0.17
0.00

71.03
47.28
61.43
69.21

4.35
2.08
0.92
1.35

1.63
2.99
1.71
2.53

0
0
0
0

26.8
32.02
16.64
22.36

6.44
0.99
0.38
0.32

1.83
0.08
0
0

0.15
0.01
0
0

207.03
2.9
1
1

55.27
12.74
5.62
83.29
27,534
1,059
47
26

3.64
1.86
1.55
1.71

33.48
4.5
2.3
24.04

81.02
26.4
13.78
98.82

includes institutional expenditure shares for the four categories of interest. On average
instruction represents the largest expense among the four categories at 36 percent, while
the others are between 8 and 15 percent. A minimum of zero spending on auxiliary
enterprises seems possible, but the minimum values for the other categories are cause for
some concern over the accuracy of the data. The sensitivity of the results to excluding
extreme minimums in expenditure shares is examined in a later section. The second panel
includes the percentage of total higher education subsidies allocated to various types of
grant aid. Overall averages are rather low, but the maximum values indicate that some
states allocate a considerable percentage of total subsidies to grants.
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Institutional control variables include total FTE, the ratio of the total headcount of
undergraduate students to total FTE (Undergrad), an indicator for whether an institution
is public, and an indicator for whether an institution is in the top three categories of the
Barron’s selectivity index. FTE and Undergrad are included under the rationale that
expenditure shares may vary with the size of the institution or as institutional revenues
rely more heavily on undergraduate enrollment and the demand pressures they exert.
Public and Selectivity are expected to moderate the effect of grant aid percentages on
expenditure shares. State control variables include median household income, poverty
rate, unemployment rate, and the percent of the population that is white. These are
included as potential factors that affect grant aid and expenditure shares.
METHODS
Expenditures shares across operational categories are a function of institutional
characteristics, some of which are observable and others that are not. It is likely that
expenditure shares differ systematically across institutions based on unobservable
characteristics. Therefore, an institution fixed effects identification strategy is used,
which leverages the within-institution variation in expenditures. Since institutions belong
to one state, this model also relies on within-state variation in state subsidies, as it is also
likely that grant allocations vary systematically by unobserved state characteristics. The
following reduced-form regressions are used to examine the effect of state subsidy
composition on institutional expenditures:
𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + (𝑁𝑠𝑠 × 𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝛽1 + (𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 × 𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝛽2 + 𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝛽3 + 𝑍𝑠𝑠 𝛽4 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗 (1)

𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + (𝑁𝑠𝑠 × 𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝛽1 + (𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 × 𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝛽2 + (𝑀𝑡𝑠𝑠 × 𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝛽3 + 𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝛽4 + 𝑍𝑠𝑠 𝛽5 + 𝜃𝑗 +
𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗

(2)

where Y is the percentage of total operational expenditures allocated to a particular
category i ∈ (instruction, academic support, student services, and auxiliary) for institution
j in state s in year t. N, NN, Mx, and Mt represent the percent of total state subsidies
allocated toward need, non-need, mixed, and merit, respectively. Each aid percentage is
interacted with one of two time-invariant institutional controls: public and selective. 𝛽1

and 𝛽2 as well as 𝛽3 in (2) are the parameters of interest, which are identified off of

within-state variation in the percentage of grant aid captured by the institution fixed
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effect 𝜃𝑗 and variation in type of institution conditional on the panel-wide time trend

captured by 𝜏𝑡 . Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for the fact that
the explanatory variables of interest vary at the state level as well as serial correlation. 31

Equations (1) and (2) account for bias from endogenous variation in expenditures
across institutions, but two additional threats to validity warrant brief discussion. First,
the percentages of grant aid must not be a function of institutional expenditures. This
reverse causality is unlikely. To the extent states deliberately alter subsidies to achieve
policy goals—the evidence for which is minimal (Hossler, 1997; SRI International,
2012)—there is little reason to suspect such decisions are based on how institutions
allocate expenditures across operational categories. Second, variation in expenditures and
grant aid percentages must not be a function of additional variables omitted from the
model. Subsidies are likely affected by economic and demographic characteristics of the
state, and it is possible that such factors also impact institutional expenditure shares. Z
includes time-variant state household median income, unemployment rate, poverty rate,
and percent of the population that is white in an attempt to mitigate this threat to validity.
Lastly, X includes time-variant institutional controls FTE and undergraduate
concentration. Institutional variables are not critical to validity but can improve the
precision of the estimates.
RESULTS
Table 4.3 presents regression results for equation (1) for select variables. 32 Each column
represents a separate regression for one of four expenditure share categories. Grant
percentages are separated into need and non-need aid and interacted with the indicator for
public institution. Recall that instruction and academic support are considered
expenditures on educational resources. Student services and auxiliary enterprises are
considered expenditures on amenities. It is also important to note that significant
31

A compositional analysis model using log ratios of each expenditure category and grant type was not
utilized for a few reasons. Compositional analysis transforms data in an attempt to obtain normally
distributed variables, which is an appealing mathematical property with small sample sizes. Additionally,
compositional analysis accounts for the negative correlation across dependent variables. In this case the
sample size is not small and institutional expenditure shares of interest are not consistently negatively
correlated. Therefore, simple linear regression was used for its ease in interpreting meaningful effect
magnitudes. See Appendix for a sensitivity analysis.
32
See Appendix for full results.
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coefficients for the interaction terms indicate an effect among public institutions that is
significantly different from the effect on private institutions along with the magnitude of
the difference, not the effect of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable. The latter is
reported in the lower panel with the marginal effects heading.
Point estimates in Column 1 indicate there is no statistically significant evidence
that the percent of total subsidy allocated toward either type of grant aid affects the share
of expenditures on instruction among private institutions. However, the linear
combination of the non-need coefficient and non-need public coefficient indicates a 1
percentage point (1pp) increase in non-need relative to other subsidies leads to a decrease
in instructional shares by 0.12pp among public institutions. With a mean instructional
share of 35.89 percent this estimate corresponds to decline of 0.3 percent. Column 2
Table 4.3 - Effect of Need and Non-need Aid on Expenditure Shares by Control
(1)
Instruction

(2)
Academic
Support

(3)
Student
Services

(4)

0.0416**
(0.0125)
0.0192
(0.0201)
-0.0464
(0.0423)
-0.0274
(0.0307)

0.0582
(0.0341)
0.0489
(0.0277)
-0.1500*
(0.0562)
-0.0870*
(0.0330)

-0.0327
(0.0291)
-0.0351
(0.0285)
0.1739*
(0.0667)
0.0316
(0.0520)

-0.0047
(0.0345)
-0.0082
(0.0228)
0.104
27534

-0.0918
(0.0494)
-0.0380
(0.0258)
0.381
27534

0.1412*
(0.0564)
-0.0036
(0.0417)
0.039
27534

Auxiliary

Grant Aid Estimates
Pct. Need
Pct. Non-need
Pct. Need x Public
Pct. Non-need x Public

0.0479
(0.0533)
0.0866
(0.0431)
-0.1488
(0.0739)
-0.2070**
(0.0755)

Public Institution Marginal Effects
Need
Non-need
R-squared
Observations

-0.1010
(0.0558)
-0.1204*
(0.0520)
0.191
27534

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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indicates that a 1pp increase in need aid increases the academic support share 0.04pp
(0.5%) among privates, while the response among publics is not statistically significant.
Based on the results in column 3, there is no evidence that private or public institutions
alter student services shares in response to an increase in either type of grant relative to
total subsidies. Lastly, the results in column 4 indicate that need aid affects the auxiliary
share among public institutions. A 1pp increase in non-need aid leads to a 0.14pp (0.9%)
increase.
Table 4.4 presents estimates for mixed and merit aid from equation (2) which
distinguishes between mixed and merit grant aid within non-need aid from equation (1).
To reiterate, these data span the years 1999 to 2015, thus some statistical power is lost
compared to the above specification. The results in column 1 indicate a 1pp increase in
mixed aid results in a 0.12pp (0.3%) increase in instruction shares among private
institutions, while there is no evidence of a significant effect among publics. There is no
evidence that either type of non-need aid impacts expenditure shares in the other three
categories among private institutions. The results from equation (1) did not indicate an
effect of non-need aid on student services, but in this specification, it appears there is an
effect. Specifically, a 1pp increase in mixed aid relative to other subsidies leads to an
increase of 0.5pp (0.5%) in the share of student services.
Overall, it is evident that the percentage of total subsidy allocated toward need or
non-need aid affects expenditure shares of private and public institutions differently. In
fact, both instances of a significant effect present among private institutions are positive
and pertain to the two educational expenditure categories, while public institutions
decrease shares pertaining to educational resources and increase shares toward amenity
categories. An increase in the percentage of grant aid is the result of a higher allocation
toward grant aid, a lower allocation toward appropriations, or both. Given that private
institutions do not receive revenue via appropriations and as long as states allow some
grant aid to be applied to private institutions, a higher grant percent allocation represents
the potential to increase revenues by charging higher tuition to grant-eligible students. In
order to increase enrollment among grant-eligible students, private institutions may shift
expenditures toward functions that attract students. The results above suggest private
institutions do this by increasing educational expenditure shares.
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Table 4.4 - Effect of Mixed and Merit Aid on Expenditures Shares by Control
(1)
Instruction

(2)
Academic
Support

(3)
Student
Services

(4)

0.0058
(0.0164)
0.0292
(0.0171)
0.0028
(0.0403)
-0.0694***
(0.0154)

-0.0546
(0.0423)
-0.0279
(0.0301)
0.1095*
(0.0479)
-0.0164
(0.0367)

-0.0258
(0.0575)
-0.0189
(0.0185)
-0.0660
(0.1369)
0.0736
(0.0583)

0.0086
(0.0282)
-0.0403
(0.0262)

0.0549**
(0.0206)
-0.0443
(0.0267)

-0.0918
(0.0886)
0.0547
(0.0601)

0.181
18003

0.019
18003

Auxiliary

Grant Aid Estimates
Pct. Mixed
Pct. Merit
Pct. Mixed x Public
Pct. Merit x Public

0.1247***
(0.0341)
0.0394
(0.0684)
-0.0156
(0.0438)
-0.0758
(0.0684)

Public Institution Marginal Effects
Mixed
Merit
R-squared
Observations

0.1091
(0.0589)
-0.0365
(0.0462)
0.020
18003

0.009
18003

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Conversely, to the extent appropriations decline more than grants increase (about
2:1 on average during this time period), an increase in grant percentages represents a
decline in revenue among public institutions. Public institutions can recover lost state
revenue by competing over grant-eligible students. The results above suggest they do so
by shifting expenditures away from educational categories and toward amenities.
Interpreting the specific types of grants involved will be discussed in more detail in the
next section.
Table 4.5 presents the results from equation (1) using the selectivity indicator as
the interaction term. These estimations include only public institutions. Selectivity is used
as a measure of institutional market power. Expenditure shares among selective
institutions are presumably less influenced by changes in student demand for goods in
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Table 4.5 - Effect of Need and Non-Need Aid on Expenditure Shares by Selectivity
(1)
Instruction

(2)
Academic
Support

(3)
Student
Services

(4)
Auxiliary

Grant Aid Estimates
Pct. Need

-0.0609
(0.0595)
Pct. Non-need
-0.1065*
(0.0424)
Pct. Need x Selective
0.1511
(0.1359)
Pct. Non-need x Selective 0.0960*
(0.0427)

-0.0073
(0.0474)
0.0194
(0.0241)
-0.0093
(0.0611)
-0.0721
(0.0431)

0.0795
(0.0513)
0.0877*
(0.0347)
-0.0638
(0.0559)
-0.0504
(0.0339)

0.0927
(0.0712)
-0.0792
(0.0598)
-0.1389
(0.1173)
0.1400*
(0.0623)

-0.0165
(0.0346)
-0.0527
(0.0342)
0.058
10348

0.0157
(0.0362)
0.0373
(0.0210)
0.230
10348

-0.0462
(0.1043)
0.0607
(0.0375)
0.083
10348

Selective Institution Marginal Effects
Need
Non-need
R-squared
Observations

0.0902
(0.1188)
-0.0105
(0.0255)
0.100
10348

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

services across the four operational categories because they have a greater abundance of
applicants. The results suggest a 1pp increase in non-need aid leads to a 0.11pp (0.3%)
decrease in instructional shares and a 0.09pp (0.9%) increase in student services shares
among less selective public institutions. Though it is not definitively conclusive without
analyzing every operational category, this result is indicative of a tradeoff between
educational resources and amenities as the percentage of total subsidy allocated to nonneed grants increases. By contrast, there is no evidence that expenditure shares among
selective public institutions are affected by changes in subsidy composition.
Table 4.6 presents results from equation (2) using the selectivity interaction
among public institutions. It appears the decline in instructional shares from an increase
in non-need aid in table 4.6 is driven by merit-based aid. A 1pp increase in the total
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Table 4.6 - Effect of Mixed and Merit Aid on Expenditure Shares by Selectivity
(1)
Instruction

(2)
Academic
Support

(3)
Student
Services

(4)
Auxiliary

Grant Aid Estimates
Pct. Mixed

0.1330*
(0.0611)
Pct. Merit
-0.0962*
(0.0469)
Pct. Mixed x Selective -0.1090**
(0.0329)
Pct. Merit x Selective 0.1137*
(0.0517)

0.0185
(0.0315)
-0.0395
(0.0304)
-0.0474
(0.0375)
0.0155
(0.0289)

0.1047*
(0.0460)
0.0295
(0.0252)
-0.0928*
(0.0403)
0.0118
(0.0350)

-0.1942**
(0.0605)
-0.0072
(0.0766)
0.1959**
(0.0631)
0.0190
(0.0946)

-0.0289
(0.0270)
-0.0240
(0.0324)
0.029
6766

0.0119
(0.0125)
0.0413
(0.0428)
0.183
6766

0.0018
(0.0798)
0.0117
(0.0616)
0.106
6766

Selective Institution Marginal Effects
Mixed
Merit
R-squared
Observations

0.0240
(0.0618)
0.0175
(0.0439)
0.094
6766

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Sample includes only
public institutions 1999-2015.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

subsidy allocated to merit-based aid results in a 0.10pp (0.3%) decline in instructional
shares among less selective public institutions. Interestingly, a 1pp increase in mixed aid
leads to a 0.13pp (0.4%) increase in instructional shares. Regarding the increase in
student services present in the above estimation, it appears that mixed aid is driving this
result. A 1pp increase in mixed aid leads to a 0.10pp (1%) increase in student services
shares as well as a 0.19pp (1.4%) decline in auxiliary shares. As in the previous
estimation, there is no evidence that mixed or merit aid percentages impact expenditure
shares among more selective public institutions. It appears that more selective institutions
are generally insulated from any changes in demand pressure state subsidy allocations
may generate.
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
The timing of effects in equations (1) and (2) are difficult to model precisely.
Specifically, whether institutional expenditures in year t are a function of state subsidies
in the same year may be a source of some misspecification. On one hand, state funding
for higher education can involve negotiations between state officials and institutions, so
institutions may have an accurate expectation of state subsidies for year t and can develop
their own budget in year t accordingly. On the other hand, the extent to which
institutional expenditures can react to state budgets the same year is likely constrained
and may instead be a function of state budgets in previous years. Only within-state
variation in subsidies is used to explain within-institution variation in expenditures, so
differences across state budget processes, such as annual versus biennial budget cycles, is
not so much a concern.
The sensitivity of results to using lagged explanatory variables was examined.
Regressions generating results in tables 4.4-4.7 were run using state subsidies lagged one
year and again with two-year lags. The point estimates for one-year lags are qualitatively
similar to those already reported but statistical significance is lost in many cases.
Virtually all statistical significance is lost using two-year lags. Together, this is
interpreted as evidence that institutional expenditures in year t primarily reflect state
subsidies in year t, rather than state subsidies in previous years.
Compositional analysis is an alternative estimation strategy when variables of
interest are proportions (Aitchison, 1986). Compositional analysis involves in this case
the institutional expenditure shares being transformed. There are three compositional
transformations, each with strengths and weaknesses, but it seems researchers in the field
of budget and finance typically choose the additive log-ratio transformation. This
involves dividing each share by a common base category, such as instruction, then using
the natural log of each ratio as the dependent variable. State subsidies could also be
modeled as a composition, but there are many cases where the proportion of a particular
grant allocation is equal to zero. There is not an agreed-upon method for dealing with
zeros in compositional data that represent a structural absence of a component (MartinFernandez, Palarea-Albaladejo, and Olea, 2011).
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Nevertheless, the fixed effects estimation reported in tables 4.4-4.7 was repeated
using additive log transformed dependent variables. The signs of estimates are the same
and statistical significance is generally consistent with the results already reported.
Statistical significance varies some in cases with marginally significant estimates in the
tables above. The only notable difference between estimations pertains to the tradeoff
between instruction and auxiliary reported in table 4.3. Using compositional dependent
variables, an increase in non-need aid still leads to a decline in instruction, while the
positive effect of need aid on auxiliary is no longer significant. Instead, an increase in
non-need aid increases the share of student services. Therefore, as states shift subsidy
allocations toward grants, evidence of a tradeoff between educational resources and
amenities remains but the type of grants involved in the tradeoff differ using
compositional dependent variables. 33
As reported in table 4.2, the minimum expenditure shares for instruction,
academic support, and student services are extremely low. This causes concern over data
accuracy and the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of institutions with such low
expenditure shares in the categories of interest. These cases are particularly problematic
if low shares are systematically subject to extreme increases that could lead to upwardly
biased estimates. The analysis reported in tables 4.4-4.7 was repeated using the sample
truncated at the first percentile of expenditure shares. The results were similar in sign,
significance, and magnitude as those previously reported. Then, institutions with missing
observations due to the truncation were excluded from the panel entirely. The results
were again similar to those already reported.
DISCUSSION
Table 4.7 summarizes the directional effects of grant proportions on expenditure shares
from the above analysis to aid interpretation. The hypotheses made at the beginning of
this chapter were predicated on the relationship between state subsidies, student demand,
and institutional response to demand pressures. As states shift funds away from
institutions and toward subsets of students, student demand for various goods and
services should more strongly reflect the demand of grant recipients. Since need-based
33

See Appendix for estimates.
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grants target lower-income students who generally have lower academic achievement and
given that increases in need-based grants primarily operate to offset increases in cost, it
was unclear how institutional expenditure shares might respond to greater demand among
need grant recipients if their demand increases at all.
Instead, the effect of an increase in the proportion of need-based aid was predicted
to be driven primarily by those who are ineligible for need-based aid. The higher-income
students ineligible for need-based aid have greater demand for amenities than their lowerincome peers who do not experience as much of an increase in price. To compete for
these higher-income students, it was predicted that institutions would increase
expenditure shares toward amenities and decrease expenditure shares in educational
resources. This is precisely the outcome reflected in the results of the analysis,
particularly among less selective public institutions that have the least market power. The
distinction between student services and auxiliary enterprises is also important here.
While shares in student services increase, so too do auxiliary shares. Goods and services
in the latter category are far more related to the traditional consumption goods included in
discussions regarding amenities in higher education.
Given the imprecision of non-need aid as it relates to the types of students who
are eligible since it can contain both mixed and merit programs, it is not surprising that
the results are largely insignificant across categories with the exception of a decline in
Table 4.7 - Directional Effects of State Grant Proportions on Expenditure Shares
Private

Public

Instruction

Academic
Support

Need Grants
Non-need Grants
Mixed
Merit
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Student
Services

Auxiliary

instructional shares among public institutions. Merit-based aid targets higher-ability
students who generally have higher income as well, thus the predicted effect of a greater
proportion of total subsidies allocated to merit-based aid on expenditure shares was also
somewhat unclear. On one hand, greater demand among higher-ability students should
lead to an increase in expenditure shares related to educational resources. On the other
hand, recipients of merit-based grants are disproportionately higher-income, so the result
may also be an increase in shares related to amenities.
The existence of mixed grant programs offers valuable insight into this ambiguity.
Recipients of mixed grants are higher-ability and lower-income, thus eliminating the
overlap in demand present with merit-based aid. Therefore, an increase in the proportion
of total subsidies allocated to mixed aid should result in greater expenditure shares
related to educational resources and lower shares related to amenities. Again, the results
reflect this, especially among less selective public institutions. The distinction between
student services and auxiliary enterprises is important here as well. Greater proportions of
mixed aid lead to institutions increasing expenditure shares toward student services
related to college access and completion, such admissions, advising, and extracurricular
activities—the types of services perhaps preferred among lower-income, higher-ability
students—and decreasing shares related to consumption goods preferred by higherincome students. Conversely, greater proportional allocation in merit-based aid results in
public institutions decreasing instruction. Coupled with the mixed aid effect on
instruction, this suggests the change in demand generated by merit-based aid is primarily
driven by higher-income students wither greater preference for amenities. However, the
increase in amenity shares that should accompany the decline in instruction is no
statistically significant.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Over the last three decades total state support for higher education has declined but
support in the form of grant aid has increased. For public colleges and universities, the
decline in state revenues requires them to increase revenues via other sources, such as
tuition, or decrease expenditures. Based on responses in tuition levels to variation in state
support, it seems public institutions do both (Webber, 2017). Coupled with a rise in grant
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aid, the higher education market becomes increasingly competitive, placing state funds in
the hands of subsets of student for whom institutions are financially incentivized to
attract to their campus. Rather than examine tuition, this chapter asked whether trends in
state subsidies affect how institutions allocate their financial resources across operational
categories that interact most with students. Specifically, given the divergent demands for
educational resources versus amenities with respect to student ability and income that the
HTHA model may amplify, it was predicted institutions would systematically alter
expenditure shares in ways that reflect this divergence.
The broad conclusion of the analysis is that targeting state subsidies on the basis
of student income and/or ability rather than appropriations leads less selective public
institutions to diverge their expenditure shares between educational resources and
amenities. Targeting subsidies on the basis of income only results in a decrease in
instruction and an increase in student services and auxiliary enterprises. Targeting
subsidies on the basis of income and ability results in an increase in instruction and
student services but a decrease in auxiliary enterprises. Targeting subsidies on the basis
of only ability results in a decline in instruction but the tradeoff with amenities is
inconclusive. Together, these results reflect a divergence in institutional expenditures
with respect to educational quality and amenities, the cause of which is claimed to be an
underlying compositional change in student demand driven by HTHA trends in state
subsidies.
This analysis does not make claims regarding the consequences to private or
social welfare from a tradeoff in expenditure shares between educational quality and
amenities. There is not sufficient knowledge of the impacts of institutional spending
across operational categories on the returns to a degree and degree completion to conduct
a cost-benefit analysis on a dollar taken from instruction to add to student services or
auxiliary enterprises. Readers may be inclined to assume shifting expenditures away from
instruction and toward student services is a negative outcome, but existing research has
found investment in student services to have a more positive impact on degree
completion than investment in instruction, especially among students at less selective
institutions (Webber & Ehrenburg 2010; Webber, 2012). However, perhaps the degrees
students are more likely to complete have less value as a result of disinvestment in
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instruction. Also, to the author’s knowledge there has been no systematic analysis of the
effects of auxiliary enterprises on student outcomes. These are important topics for future
research.
This analysis also contributes to the large literature concerning the effects of state
financial aid on college student outcomes. Evidence is mixed as to whether broad meritbased aid increases college completion (Dynarski, 2008; Henry, Rubenstein, & Burglar
2004; Bruce & Carruthers, 2011; Scott-Clayton, 2011; Sjoquist & Winters, 2012).
Though there is mixed evidence that need-based aid increases student access (Perna &
Titus, 2004; Goldrick-Rab, Harris, & Trostel, 2009), there is fairly consistent evidence of
increased persistence (Bettinger, 2004; Goldrick-Rab, Harris, Kelchen, & Benson, 2012),
while gains in college completion appear to be concentrated among higher-ability
students who receive need-based aid (Castleman & Long, 2013). The explanations for
these results are numerous and nuanced, but this analysis is the first to offer evidence that
grant aid’s impact on institutional expenditure shares may be an important mediating or
moderating factor.
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[5]
STUDENT MIGRATION, SUCCESS, AND THE ROLE OF STATE SUBSIDIES
The focus in previous chapters has been to theoretically or empirically examine policy
pertaining to state subsidy composition and its impact on the higher education market. In
brief, the argument has been made that the dominant trend of reallocating appropriations
to grant aid drives a divergence in demand between educational resources and amenities
across students of various incomes and abilities. Empirical evidence has been presented
that supports this causal claim in the form of college-going patterns among students and
institutional expenditures in response to changes in subsidy composition.
Student migration is a critical aspect of the higher education market that has yet to
be incorporated into this discussion. Though student migration can be defined in a few
different ways, it fundamentally involves the travelling of some distance between the
student’s point of origin and the institution of her choice. Virtually every study to include
the distance between students’ location and postsecondary institution has found it to
impose a cost that deters access and choice. When public policy such as state subsidy
composition affects college access and choice the distances students migrate to attend
college are altered. The effect of distance on college student success is therefore a
relevant line of inquiry when considering potential unintended consequences of state
subsidy composition.
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a more thorough analysis of the
relationship between distance and college-going between initial enrollment and
completion of a degree than what currently exists in the literature. Building off of
Chapter 3, a theoretical framework incorporating distance into the processes of choice
and persistence is developed, demonstrating how distance might be expected to affect the
likelihood that a student completes a degree at her institution of choice. The effect of
distance on persistence and completion is estimated separately for students seeking an
associate's versus a bachelor's degree. College transfer behavior is also examined as it
relates to distance.
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TRENDS IN DISTANCES MIGRATED TO ATTEND COLLEGE
There are two lines of research that commonly incorporate the distance between students’
location and a set of postsecondary institutions. First, various measures of distance have
been used as a source of exogenous variation in educational attainment to estimate its
monetary and social returns. These studies find distance to be a significant predictor of
attainment but do not examine the underlying mechanisms. Second, scholars include
distance in studies of student migration or college access and choice. These studies
consistently find distance to impose a cost that deters the enrollment outcome of interest
but do not examine whether student success is impacted.
Moreover, the effect of distance on college-going behavior has changed over
time. Studying college choice among student cohorts in 1972, 1982, and 1992, Long
(2004) finds the deterrence of distance has decreased each period. Hoxby (1997) finds a
similar decline from 1949 to 1994 and proposes several explanatory factors, one of which
is policy that expands students’ feasible set of institutions, such as interstate tuition
reciprocity agreements. In turn, the role of distance in college access and choice
diminishes. As policy alters the distance students migrate to attend college, policymakers
should be concerned whether distance subsequently imposes a cost on students while
attempting to complete a degree.
If distance to an institution has become less of a deterrent to college choice over
time, how does this change manifest when observing the actual distances students
migrate to attend college? Intuitively, one would expect more students to migrate greater
distances as a result. Each year, the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) surveys
a nationally representative sample of incoming freshmen. Survey participants are asked,
"How many miles away is your institution from your permanent home?" and given a set
of ranges for answers: less than 10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-500, over 500. Results from the
past 40 years of this survey item were collected in order to examine trends in distances.
Panels A and B of Figure 5.1 show 5-year moving averages of the distances
migrated between 1975 and 2015 as a percentage of all freshman attending public
universities and 4-year colleges, respectively. For public universities, the most steadily
changing range is over 500 miles, which has risen from approximately 5 to 15 percent of
freshmen. The other ranges have remained relatively the same with mild fluctuations
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Figure 5.1 - Distances Migrated to College, 1975-2015
Panel A

Panel B

Panel C
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until around 2008, at which point all ranges of distance change more noticeably. During
this time, the percentage of freshman traveling less than 50 and over 500 increased, while
the proportion traveling between those extremes decreased. Distances migrated by
students attending public 4-year colleges exhibit similar trends.
Panel C shows 5-year moving averages of the distances migrated by all freshmen
attending private universities. Given that states do not subsidize the cost of private
institutions for their residents, the private sector of higher education is more competitive
on a national scale compared to the public sector. This is evidenced by the much higher
percentage of freshmen migrating over 500 miles. Still, as is the case with public
institutions, the percentage of freshmen migrating over 500 miles has risen fairly
consistently from approximately 29 to 38 percent. The percentage of freshmen migrating
100 miles or less was about the same in 2015 as 1975. The percentage of freshmen
migrating between 100 and 500 miles dropped precipitously from 2007 to 2015 at which
point the percentage of freshmen migrating 50 or less and over 500 show noticeable
increases.
Although conclusions should be drawn with caution from these data, it does
appear more students are migrating greater distances over time. In both public and private
sectors, the percentage of students migrating over 500 miles exhibits a clear upward
trend. Another pattern emerging from these trends is the possible impact the Great
Recession had on distances migrated. Among public and private universities especially,
the trends exhibit distinct changes around 2008 in which the percentages of freshmen
migrating distances of each extreme -- 50 or less and over 500 miles -- increase. Overall,
the above figures demonstrate that the distances students migrate to attend college in the
U.S. are subject to fluctuations. Based on the literature, these fluctuations are likely due
to a combination of changes in student preferences and exogenous changes in the higher
education market.
DISTANCE AND COLLEGE ENROLLMENT
College enrollment can involve several different outcomes. Access typically
concerns enrollment opportunity and policy’s ability to promote equality. College choice
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concerns the determinants or consequences of enrolling in one institution over others.
Student migration, though also about choice, is primarily concerned with students
crossing borders in making their choice.
Virtually every study to incorporate distance into college enrollment has found it
to be a deterrent. A dearth of proximate institutions hinders access (Hillman &
Weichman, 2016), particularly among the socioeconomically disadvantaged (Turley,
2009). Analyzing enrollment of nationally representative samples, the probability a
student chooses to enroll at an institution is decreasing in distance (Long, 2004). Distance
also deters interstate migration (Gossman, 1967; McHugh & Morgan, 1984; Kyung,
1996; Hoxby, 1997; Cooke & Boyle, 2011) and is a significant determinant of intrastate
migration flows between high schools and colleges; even more so than tuition in some
cases (McConnell, 1965; Kariel, 1968; Ullis & Knowles, 1975; Leppel, 1993;
Ordovensky, 1995; Ali, 2003; Alm & Winters, 2009).
It is clear distance imposes a substantial cost on students that impacts the
decision-making process of initial enrollment. The cost of distance is easily conceived as
financial in nature but its potential to impose a psychological or social cost should also be
considered (Tinto, 1987; Ovink & Kalogrides, 2015). In either case, it is unlikely such
costs disappear after enrollment, but rather persist for as long as a student attends a
particular institution. Whether or the extent to which distance subsequently impacts
student persistence, transfers, or degree completion are not addressed in the above
literature.
DISTANCE AND COLLEGE COMPLETION
Since Card (1993), distance has been used as an instrumental variable (IV) to address the
endogeneity of educational attainment in estimating wages or other returns (Kane &
Rouse, 1995; Kling, 2001; Currie & Moretti, 2003; Carneiro & Taber, 2004; Dee, 2004;
Doyle & Skinner, 2016). Unlike K-12, the prevailing thought is families do not locate
based on the quality of proximate postsecondary institutions. 34 If it can be demonstrated
that distance affects attainment, then distance provides a source of exogenous variation in
34

Rouse (1995) and Careiro and Heckman (2002) find some evidence that distance to postsecondary
institutions is correlated with family characteristics and academic ability. Caution should be used in
claiming strict exogeneity of distance.
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attainment. Though studies that use this method are primarily interested in a second-stage
outcome, they must first estimate the effect of distance on attainment.
Additionally, the measurement of distance and attainment among the IV studies
varies. For instance, Card (1993) uses the presence of a four-year institution within a
county and finds this proximity increases the years of school 0.32 to 0.38 years. In
contrast, Dee (2004) finds that living within 100 miles of a community college does not
affect the attainment of an associate's degree but does increase the attainment of a
bachelor's degree by 3.2 percent. Indeed, Doyle and Skinner (2016) demonstrate that
attainment estimates are sensitive to the type of distance measurement used.
A small set of literature has examined the relationship between distance and
degree completion more directly. Rouse (1995) uses miles to the nearest institution by
type and finds that an increase of 10 miles to a four-year college decreases years of
schooling by a miniscule amount, while distance to a community college has no effect on
years of education when family background is included. Leigh and Gill (2003) argue that
it is important to control for a student's desired amount of schooling. In doing so, they
find proximity to a community college increases educational attainment by 0.4 to 1.0
years among individuals desiring a bachelor's degree.
Overall, it is apparent distance affects attainment but how? Is the effect driven
entirely by the local average treatment effect on attendance? That would suggest once a
student is induced into college by a change in distance, any remaining distance would
have no effect on subsequent success. The relationship between distance and success is
mostly a black box in the existing literature. Little is known as to whether the distance a
student ultimately migrates to attend college impacts elements of success, such as
persistence, transfers, and degree completion.
POLICY CONTEXT
Public policy can alter the distances student migrate to attend college, and thus the
effect of distance on success is a policy issue. For example, federal programs like the
College Scorecard aim to broaden students' college search beyond nearby institutions,
drawing criticism for ignoring student mobility (Turley, 2009; Hillman & Weichman,
2016). State government is also interested in altering student migration. An explicit goal
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achieved by broad state merit aid programs is to prevent high-achieving students from
migrating out of state (Toutkoushian, 2012). Additionally, a decrease in appropriations
increases the likelihood that students enroll out of state (Perna & Titus, 2004) and leads
state institutions to increase the proportion of nonresident enrollees (Jaquette & Curs,
2015) or raise admissions standards for resident students (Epple et al., 2013), thus
reducing more proximate seats for students.
Perhaps the most direct case of policy affecting distance is the placement of
institutions. Although the spatial distribution of postsecondary institutions—especially
public and nonprofit—is quite static, Long and Kennedy (2012) find that an average of
0.77 college credits could be gained if all states located institutions optimally. This
generally involves moving four-year institutions to densely populated areas and two-year
institutions away from those areas, which runs somewhat counter to the literature on
community college proximity.
A less direct but relevant policy lever affecting distance is the delivery of state
subsidies shifting increasingly toward financial aid rather than appropriations. Much like
tuition reciprocity agreements, this change in subsidy composition degrades the tuition
differentials between state borders. However, instead of intentionally expanding the
market for all students, students who are ineligible for state financial aid—lower-ability
and/or higher-income—are most affected. If the distances students migrate to attend
college negatively impact success, then large scale policies involving state subsidies may
reduce success among specific subsets of students along income and ability.
DISTANCE, COLLEGE CHOICE, AND SUCCESS
Given that a student has decided to pursue a degree and a particular institution to
attend, how might distance be involved in the process of persisting at that institution until
completing a degree? The impact of distance can be conceptualized in at least three ways.
First, there is the financial cost of traveling a distance. Second, there is the cost to
available time. Lastly, there is the cognitive effect of being a certain distance from home.
As with enrollment and choice of institution, persistence is a discrete choice
problem. Each college j among all feasible colleges J offers a package of goods
consisting of academic quality q and amenities b. Academic quality represents the
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characteristics of an institution that generate returns to education or add value to a degree.
Amenities include all other characteristics of an institution that provide utility to a student
through consumption. Student i persists at college k in period t so long as the utility he
receives is greater than the utility of attending any other college or entering the
workforce, represented by the equation,
𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �

1 𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑅𝑘𝑘 (𝑒𝑘𝑘 ), 𝑏𝑘𝑘 ) ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐼𝑖𝑖
0 𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

,
(1)

where s is the indicator for persistence, R is the return to a degree from the institution,
and P is the price of college k that must remain within the student’s budget constraint I.
There must be at least one factor involved in persistence that is not involved in the
process of choice. Otherwise, there would be no reason to separately consider
persistence. The price of attendance is obviously such a factor, as price can change after
choice such that s equals zero in a later period. Price is not the only reason students fail to
persist though. Academic performance can be so low that the institution does not allow
the student to persist. Less extreme than forced exit is that a student’s academic
performance lowers the value of the degree being pursued such that persistence is no
longer utility maximizing. In both cases, GPA is a useful measure of academic
performance.
Incorporating GPA motivates a modification to equation (1). The return to a
degree is an increasing function of academic quality and GPA. Let us assume the
difference in academic quality between institutions does not change so much as to
meaningfully affect persistence after choice. Therefore, while attending an institution, the
return to a degree depends solely on a student's GPA g, while overall utility also involves
leisure l, resulting in the utility function
𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑔𝑖𝑘𝑘 , 𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖 ).

(2)

In a given time period T, a student allocates time between academic work w, leisure l, and
commuting c between his residence and campus, or formally,
𝑇 = 𝑤𝑖 + 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖𝑖 .

(3)

GPA is a function of the quantity of time allocated to academic work, academic
ability, and a random component signifying the uncertain relationship between time
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allocated to academic work and GPA. Academic ability a is the marginal productivity of
𝜕𝑔

academic work 𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑖 . The following equation formally defines GPA,
𝑖𝑖

𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 ,

(4)

where the random component 𝜖 is assumed to be additive and normally distributed
𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 ). Distance from home d, academic quality, and time allocated to leisure impact
marginal academic productivity. For instance, one hour of work at a community college
increases GPA more than one hour of work at an elite university. Regarding leisure, at
the very least a student must allocate some time toward sleep in order for academic work
to be productive. The effect of distance is not as clear since some students benefit from
distance, while others have difficulty coping with it. These factors enter into equation (4)
like a tax, and by substituting w with equation (3), GPA can be represented by the
following equation:
𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 �1 − 𝜏(𝑑𝑖𝑖 , 𝑞𝑘 , 𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖 )�(𝑇 − 𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝜖𝑖𝑖 ,

where 0 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 1 ,

𝑑𝑑

𝑑𝑑

⋛ 0,

𝑑𝑑

𝑑𝑑

> 0, and

𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑

(4)

< 0. Finally, defining the GPA below which

exit from the institution is either forced or voluntary as 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖 = max{𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, 𝑔0 },

then persistence becomes the conditional equation,
𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �

1 𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐼𝑖𝑖
0 𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖

.

(5)

Figure 5.2 displays a hypothetical allocation under these assumptions. GPA is on
the vertical axis, and leisure is on the horizontal axis. The constraint is fixed at total time
T along the horizontal axis. The point at which a student's GPA causes the utility of a
degree to no longer be greater than any alternative, leading the student to exit the
institution is represented by line e. The figure displays a scenario in which a student
maximizes utility at points (g*, l*).
Unless a student relocates on or near campus in a later time period, both distance
and academic quality were determined in the choice process. A brief outline of the choice
process completes the framework relevant in this study. At this stage, distance is an input
for academic quality and amenities. At zero distance, a student acquires zero quality and
amenities. Provided the utility maximizing institution is neither most proximate nor most
distant to the student, quality and amenities are increasing in distance at a decreasing rate.
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Increasing distance allows a student to attend institutions of increasing quality or
amenities, and there is a distance at which the institution of highest quality and amenities
is available. Distances beyond this point do not increase the quality or amenities
attainable.
Put simply, a student will choose an institution with quantities of academic
quality and amenities that provides greater utility than all other institutions provided he
can persist there academically and financially. More formally, the discrete choice follows
the equation,
𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑈𝑖𝑖 �𝑅𝑖𝑖 (𝑞𝑖𝑖 (𝑑𝑖 ), 𝑔𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑞𝑘 , 𝑙𝑖𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖𝑖 )), 𝑏𝑖𝑖 (𝑑𝑖 )� > 𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗
∗
≥ 𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐼𝑖 .
𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑖

(6)

Equation (6) aligns with the college-going behavior observed in the market. Proximity
increases the likelihood that students will enroll and choose a particular institution. Some
institutions, if feasible, provide sufficiently high utility to be chosen at any distance.
Furthermore, the phenomenon of under matching is not only due to financial constraints
but also preferences for amenities and leisure, or the uncertainty of academic
performance and risk aversion.
Figure 5.2 also shows how institutional choice affects the probability of
persistence. Attending a college of farther distance away or higher quality rotates the
constraint downward, resulting in a new allocation (g', l*). 35 Now there are fewer feasible
allocations of work and leisure that lie above e. As the constraint approaches e, the
probability of persistence decreases at any allocation of g and l.
Recall that the return to a degree is increasing in quality. This is represented by
the new exit line e' where a degree from the higher quality institution remains the best
option at lower GPA values. The return to a degree from an institution relative to all other
options is represented by the vertical distance between g and e. So long as the cost of
distance or quality to GPA (g* - g') is less than the benefit gained (e -e'), then distance
and quality increase the probability of persistence. Due to the diminishing return to
Figure 5.2 - Academic Labor-Leisure Model

35

The figure illustrates quasi-linear utility such that distance does not affect time allocated to leisure, but as
long as there is not perfect substitutability between academic effort and leisure, g is decreasing in d.
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distance on quality—and academic productivity if positive at all—the cost eventually
exceeds the benefit and decreases the likelihood of persistence.
If assumptions are made regarding students’ academic ambition prior to choice as
well as the quality of institutions across type, then additional propositions can be made
with respect to distance and college-going behavior. Suppose students decide to pursue
an associate’s or bachelor’s prior to choice of institution. Let us also assume that
academic quality does not vary with respect to associate’s degrees. That is to say the
return to an associate’s degree is equal across all institutions. Conversely, there is a strict
ranking in academic quality with respect to bachelor’s degrees among four-year
institutions.
Under these assumptions, a student seeking an associate’s degree maximizes its
return by attending the most proximate institution unless the cost of migrating to a more
distant two-year institution is less than the difference in tuition compared to the most
proximate four-year institution. Otherwise, migrating any farther than the minimum
distance is due solely to a student’s marginal rate of substitution of quality for amenities.
Therefore, the effect of distance on persistence or degree completion is expected to be
non-positive on average. The cost of distance to time is attributable to the act of
commuting. Given that most associate’s degree seekers attend community colleges that
do not have residence halls, the effect of distance is due to cost to time rather than
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academic ability since such students presumably live at home. In general, distance is
expected to have a larger impact on persistence among these students.
For students seeking a bachelor’s degree, a student migrates the minimum
distance that attains a utility-maximizing quantity of academic quality and amenities. The
relationship between distance and choice of institution is expected to be weaker
compared to those seeking an associate’s degree. If a student relocates to campus, thus
eliminating the cost of commuting, any effect of distance is primarily through academic
ability. Such a distinction would be possible to estimate if data included residential
choices of students. Given the relationship between distance and quality, the effect of
distance on persistence is expected to be negative quadratic.
In sum, estimating the effect of distance—or any factor—on student success at an
institution involves a two-stage decision process resulting in the student being observed
at that institution: degree type enrollment and institutional choice. How these sources of
selection bias are empirically modeled has important implications for external validity.
This will be discussed in more detail following the next section.
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Data for this study were obtained from the Kentucky Center for Education and
Workforce Statistics (KCEWS), which administers the state’s P-20 database. The analytic
sample contains four cohorts of all graduates from Kentucky public high schools between
2008-09 and 2011-12 academic years. The first cohort aligns with the first year in which
comprehensive data is available. Data contain the 2015-2016 academic year, enabling
four years of in-state college-going behavior to be observed for the most recent cohort. 36
The data contain time-invariant demographics of sex and race as well as timevariant information on limited-English-proficiency (LEP), special education (SPED),
gifted, and free and reduced-price lunch (FRPL), all of which reflect a student’s status in
their senior year. High school academic achievement is available via ACT scores, final
high school GPA, the number of Advanced Placement classes taken, and college credits

36

A notable limitation of the data is out-of-state college matriculates are not observed unless they applied
for financial aid in Kentucky. Approximately 8 percent of all Kentucky college matriculates go out of state.
The data capture about 1 percent. The missing students are presumed to be an atypical subgroup that whose
absence in the data should not impact results or policy implications.
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earned in high school. The geographic coordinates of students’ high school and all
Kentucky public and private nonprofit two-year and four-year institutions available
through IPEDS were used to calculate the geodesic distance based on the Vincenty
computational formula. Observations missing one or more of these variables were
dropped, resulting in a 6 percent reduction and a total of 149,183 high school graduates in
the full sample.
Table 5.1 provides sample means of demographic and high school variables for
the full sample of graduates in Column 1 and college matriculates in Column 2. Between
2009 and 2012, 66 percent of public high school graduates (93,617) enrolled in college
within two years. The group of matriculates is less male, more affluent, took more AP
classes, and had higher ACT and GPA achievement. Matriculates do not differ much
along racial composition, and actually earned slightly more college credits while in high
school. Lastly, proximity to the nearest two-year and four-year institution is roughly
equivalent between the groups at 16 and 14 miles, respectively.
Several postsecondary variables are of interest. Among those who enrolled in
Kentucky, 95 percent are identified as seeking an associate’s, bachelor’s, or are
undeclared. The college student sample was reduced to include only these students.
Relevant outcomes include college persistence to the second year of college as well as
completion of a degree within four years for all cohorts and six years for the first two
cohorts (2009-10).
Table 5.2 reports sample means of postsecondary variables for all students in all
four cohorts in Column 1, only those seeking an associate’s (Group A) or bachelor’s
degree (Group B) in Columns 2 and 3, respectively. Columns 4-6 report means for the
same groups but only for the first two cohorts for which six years of data are available.
Since these are all recent high school graduates, very few students attend part-time,
which is highest among Group A at 20 percent. No one in Group B attended two-year
institutions, which suggests one cannot declare as seeking a bachelor’s degree. Students
who attend a two-year school with intentions to attain a bachelor’s are either in Group A
or in the full sample that includes undeclared students.
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Table 5.1 - Sample Means of High School Variables
Graduates

Matriculates

(1)

(2)

Male

49.33

44.25

White

85.35

85.16

Black

9.36

9.24

Hispanic

2.12

1.93

FRPL

41.67

34.52

SPED

1.59

0.66

LEP

0.50

0.29

Gifted

23.36

29.68

ACT

18.89

20.14

GPA

2.90

3.11

AP Classes

1.37

1.73

College Credits

1.51

1.66

Enrolled

66.18

100.00

Nearest 2-year

16.64

16.19

Nearest 4-year

14.63

14.31

Unemployment

9.84

9.79

149,183

93,601

Students

Notes: Sample for Column 1 includes all Kentucky
public high school graduates between academic years
2008-09 and 2011-12, and Column 2 includes all
graduates who enrolled at an in-state postsecondary
institution within two years and sought an associate’s,
bachelor’s or were undeclared.

Approximately 80 percent of all students persisted to the second year. This rate
falls to 67 percent for Group A and rises to 87 percent for Group B. About 36 percent
attained either an associate’s or bachelor’s degree during the time period, which is
deflated due to limited number of years the two most recent cohorts are observed. The
four-year graduation rate was 31 percent among all students, while the six-year rate was
43 percent among the first two cohorts. Six-year graduation rates were 31 and 53 percent
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for Group A and B, respectively. Not all students attain the degree they initially sought.
About 9 percent of Group A attain a bachelor’s, while 4 percent of Group B attained an
associate’s instead. Lastly, all students travelled an average of 40 miles to attend college,
but migration differs between degree seeking groups. Group A travelled 26 miles,
roughly half the distance travelled by students in Group B at 53 miles.
Table 5.3 takes a closer look at sample means related to distance and collegegoing behavior. Approximately 29 percent of all students attended the institution nearest
to them. As expected, substantially more students in Group A attend the nearest school
(40 percent) than those in Group B (22 percent). This disparity is even greater when the
type of institution is considered. Almost 70 percent of students in Group A attended the
nearest two-year school, while 9 percent attended the nearest
Table 5.2 - Sample Means of Postsecondary Variables
All Cohorts (2009-12)

First Two Cohorts (2009-10)

All

Group A

Group B

All

Group A

Group B

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Part-time

10.07

19.61

1.23

9.77

18.31

1.13

Full-time

89.93

80.40

98.78

90.23

81.71

98.87

Two-year

37.51

85.43

0.00

37.98

84.57

0.01

Four-year

62.49

14.57

100.00

62.02

15.44

100.00

Persisted

78.59

67.11

87.41

80.05

69.57

88.57

Associate's

8.58

15.91

3.38

9.20

16.82

3.92

Bachelor's

27.72

6.55

42.82

31.86

8.82

49.24

Graduated

27.74

24.09

30.61

42.80

30.67

52.74

Distance

39.96

24.15

52.89

39.62

24.51

52.75

Nearest 2-year

16.19

16.52

16.28

16.19

16.73

16.35

Nearest 4-year

14.31

16.79

12.70

14.29

16.94

12.63

Students

93,601

29,983

50,023

47,826

14,602

24,849

Notes: Sample includes all graduates of Kentucky public high schools who enrolled into an in-state
postsecondary institution and sought an associate’s (Group A), bachelor’s (Group B), or were undeclared.
Graduated for all cohorts includes 4-year rates, and 6-year rates for the last two cohorts.
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Table 5.3 - Means related to distance and success
All Cohorts (2009-12)
All

Group A

Group B

Attended nearest

29.34

39.99

21.65

Attended nearest 2-year

35.62

69.61

0.00

Attended nearest 4-year

18.28

9.33

25.59

Persisted and transferred

14.37

11.43

15.69

Transferred closer

59.91

41.21

68.86

Upward transfer

13.96

43.43

0.00

88.11

91.98

85.92

26.21

16.76

30.67

Graduated at same school
Graduated at closer school

Observations
93,601
29,983
50,023
Notes: Sample includes all graduates of Kentucky public high schools who

enrolled into an in-state postsecondary institution and sought an associate’s,
bachelor’s, or were undeclared. Percentages of indented variables are relative
to the main variable above.

four-year school. By contrast, only 26 percent of Group B attended the nearest four-year
school. Among the 80 percent of students who persisted to the second year, 14 percent
transferred to a difference school and transfers were more prevalent among students in
Group B than Group A. Among those who transferred, 60 percent transferred to a more
proximate institution. This rate rises to nearly 70 percent for Group B compared to 41
percent of Group A. Transfers are defined as upward if done from a two-year to a fouryear school, which among Group A students who transferred 43 percent did so. Lastly,
among those who graduate, most do so at the school they initially matriculated, though 14
percent of Group B students graduated at a difference school and 31 percent of them did
so at a more proximate school.
Kentucky is somewhat smaller than the median of states, ranking 37th in land area
that spans approximately 420 miles east-to-west and 182 miles north-to-south. Also,
Kentucky ranks 28th in public institutions per capita. Though the data include only instate college students, 80 percent of all college students in the nation enrolled in state as
of 2012. Therefore, the sample represents a large majority of college-going behavior
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among the population. Furthermore, an important advantage of these data compared to a
national survey is the statistical power gained from the higher number of observations.
For instance, the three national surveys administered decades apart used by Long (2004)
have about 1,000 four-year college observations each and even fewer at the two-year
level. Alm and Winters (2009) stress the importance of intra-state migration but use
school level data in Georgia.
Figure 5.3 provides some visual context to the study showing the approximate
location of Kentucky public colleges and universities and the percentage of county
population above age 25 with an associate's degree or higher by quintile. Perusal of the
shading and locations suggests there is a positive correlation between proximity and
attainment, just as existing literature suggests. In order to make conclusions concerning
the causal relationship between distance and success, more rigorous analysis is required.

Figure 5.3 – Kentucky County Population 25+ with Associate's or Higher

METHODS
Assuming linearity in parameters, the effect of distance on college outcome y for student
i at college j can be estimated by the reduced-form equation
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝑑ℎ𝑗 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖

(7)

where d is distance between the student’s high school h and chosen institution, X is a
vector of student demographics and high school achievement variables reported in Table
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1 and 𝜖 is idiosyncratic error. Because we cannot observe marginal academic productivity
nor students’ residential choices in the data, the effect of distance in (7) captures

financial, cognitive, and temporal mechanisms. Though the effect of distance is expected
to be negative on average, the contribution of particular mechanisms is unclear.
Based on theory in the previous section, insight into mechanisms can be gained if
additional assumptions are made. If we assume students choose what level of degree to
pursue before choosing a college, rather than the proximity affecting the level pursued,
then the type of degree sought can be included as a valid explanatory variable. If we
assume further that students seeking an associate’s degree commute, while student’s
seeking a bachelor’s degree relocate, then a difference in the effect of distance between
the two groups reflects the difference between temporal and cognitive mechanisms.
Making this distinction also requires the assumption that the marginal financial cost of
distance is the same between both groups, which seems reasonable. Separate estimations
are conducted by type of degree sought that include a quadratic distance term to examine
nonlinearities between the two groups. This approach requires the sample be reduced by
14 percent to include only degree-seeking students. 37
Since distance is specific to the chosen institution the outcomes in y require
careful defining that deviates from how college success is typically reported. For
instance, graduation rates are reported regardless of transfers. Using a binary outcome for
degree completion at any institution would inaccurately estimate the effect of distance.
Therefore, the primary outcome of interest for y is referred to as success, which is defined
as completing a degree at the institution in which a student initially matriculated. Almost
25 percent of all degree-seeking matriculates met this definition of success in four years,
and 35 percent of those in the first two cohorts were successful within six years. Another
outcome of interest is persistence to the second year. Unlike degree completion, all
cohorts can be included in the analysis without requiring a time constraint. As with fourand six-year success, a student is coded as having persisted if he attends the same
institution in the second year that he initially chose to attend in the first year.

37

Almost all students in the sample not identified as seeking one of the two degrees are labeled undeclared.
It is not clear what the educational ambitions of these students include, as attendance at two-year versus
four-year institutions is not significantly different.
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The potential issue with estimating equation (7) is students select into the
institution, jointly determining the value of d that is observed. Depending on the variables
included in X, the claim that distance migrated is uncorrelated with the error term may be
dubious. A potential solution to omitted variable bias in (7) is
2
𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾1 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝑔𝑔 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(8)

where index g is incorporated to distinguish type of degree and 𝛼 is the institution fixed
effect. The inclusion of institution fixed effects estimates 𝛾 using within-institution
variation in distance across students and controls for endogenous variation in the outcome
of interest across institutions. In other words, (8) estimates the effect of distance using
students who pursued the same degree, chose to attend the same institution, and whose
success is impacted by the same unobservable characteristics of the institution.
Again, depending on controls, distance even within institution may be
endogenous. A student who migrates a long distance may have an unobservable affinity
for that particular institution. Such a case seems more likely among four-year institutions.
Additionally, perhaps greater distance is associated with higher motivation, which could
apply to students attending four- or two-year institutions. In either instance, assuming
affinity or motivation is positively associated with success, the direction of the omitted
variable bias is positive. However, this is not a concern so long as one is willing to
assume unobservable characteristics associated with distances migrated to an institution
are time-invariant, as the fixed effect averages such factors out in the error term.
Therefore, (8) is used as the base model to estimate the effect of distance on success and
to compare with results of the dual-lambda selection correction method described below.
A variation of the dual-lambda method developed by Vijverberg (1995) is used
that corrects for selection bias resulting from a two-stage choice with multiple
alternatives. Vivjerberg (1995) shows that Lee’s (1983) method for correcting selection
bias due to a prior choice with multiple alternatives is poorly suited if there is more than
one choice involved in the process. For example, scholars estimate wage equations
correcting for labor force participation, while others correct for migration choices. Both
participation and migration are likely interrelated; Vivjerberg models labor participation
as conditional on location. Critically, if the biases work in opposite directions, then bias
may not be detected at all. The dual-lambda method accounts for selection over multiple
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interrelated choices with any number of alternatives and allows one to estimate the two
selectivity effects separately.
Estimating student success at a particular institution is quite similar to the above
example. College students are observed at an institution as a result of two choices: 1) they
chose to pursue either an associate’s or bachelor’s degree, and 2) they chose to attend that
institution among numerous alternatives. It is highly likely steps 1 and 2 are interrelated,
which is supported by patterns in the data described in the previous section. A large
majority of student’s seeking an associate’s degree attend a community college, while
those seeking a bachelor’s degree almost exclusively attend a public or private four-year
school. Furthermore, less than 0.5 percent of students seeking an associate’s attended a
private four-year school. Therefore, estimation proceeds under the assumption that
probabilities of college choice are conditional on the type of degree pursued.
Using the dual-lambda method, estimating the effect of distance on success
involves a linear probability model for the following equation
2
𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎1𝑗𝑗 𝜆𝑗|𝑔 + 𝜎2𝑔𝑔 𝜆𝑔 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖

(9)

where 𝜆𝑗|𝑔 is an extension of the Inverse Mills Ratio (Heckman, 1978) that corrects for

selection of college j conditional on degree type g, 𝜆𝑔 corrects for selection of degree
type, and 𝜎 is the estimated parameter for each selection term. Rejection of the null for 𝜎

indicates the presence of selection bias, while negative values indicate positive bias and
vice versa. If 𝜎1𝑗𝑗 < 0, then students pursuing that type of degree who choose institution
j are more likely to succeed than the population of college students, and if 𝜎2𝑔𝑔 < 0, then
students who choose to pursue that type of degree are more likely to succeed than the
population of college students.
Given the discrete nature of college-going behavior outlined in the previous
section, a multinomial logit is used to estimate the probability of seeking an associate’s or
bachelor’s degree as well as a Kentucky postsecondary institution conditional on type of
degree. The probability student i pursuing degree g chooses to attend institution j=1
among all alternatives J is estimated via the functional form
Pr(yig = 1) = exp�𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑖1 � / (exp(𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑖1 ) + ⋯ + exp(𝛽𝐽 𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) ).
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(10)

The estimated probabilities are used to calculate the values for 𝜆 in (9). 38

Identification of each 𝜆 relies on including variables in the first-stage multinomial

logit that predict either type of degree or institution and can be excluded from the secondstage. Variables used to predict type of degree include the county unemployment rate and
the percent of the county adult population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Given the
evidence that individuals do not sort based on proximity to postsecondary institutions, the
distance between students and each institution is considered to be exogenous. Therefore,
a gravity model measure commonly found in migration research is used as an IV for
choice of institution that quantifies the pull each institution exerts on each student based
on its size and proximity, or
𝐸

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑2𝑗 ,

where E is the enrollment at institution j.

𝑖𝑖

(11)

BASE MODEL RESULTS
Table 5.4 shows the estimated effect of distance on four- and six-year success (i.e.
completed a degree from initially chosen institution) as well as two-year persistence at
the same school for those seeking an associate’s degree in Columns 1-2 (Group A) and
bachelor’s degree in Columns 3-4 (Group B). Distance is modeled as a quadratic or
logarithmic function for both groups. The sample mean for each outcome is displayed at
the top of each set of estimates.
According to the results in Column 1, there is no evidence that distance affects
four-year success among those in Group A if modeled as a quadratic. However, Column
2 suggests the effect of distance on four-year success is statistically significant if modeled
logarithmically. On average, a one-percent increase in distance decreases the likelihood
of four-year success 0.007 percentage point among students seeking an associate’s degree
at the same institution. Based on a sample mean of 22 percent, this represents a 0.03
percent decrease. Average distance among these students is 23 miles with a standard
deviation of 27 miles. Therefore, the results suggest that a student seeking an associate’s
degree at a particular institution who travels one standard deviation greater distance has a

38

See Appendix for the formulas used to construct the values of lambda
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Table 5.4 - Effect of Distance on Success

Four-year Success
Distance
(10 miles or 1%)
Distance2
Mean Distance
Students
Six-Year Success
Distance
(10 miles or 1%)
Distance2
Mean Distance
Students
Two-Year Persistence
Distance
(10 miles or 1%)
Distance2
Mean Distance
Students
Student Controls
Institution FE
Year FE

Group A
Quadratic
(1)
[0.2213]
-0.0045
(0.0027)
0.0002
(0.0002)
23.11
28,111
[0.2581]
-0.0058
(0.0039)
0.0003
(0.0003)
24.16
13,605
[0.5956]
-0.0126***
(0.0034)
0.0004
(0.0002)
23.11
28,111
Y
Y
Y

Group A
Log
(2)

Group B
Group B
Quadratic
Log
(3)
(4)
[0.2538]
-0.0067*
0.0065***
0.0078**
(0.0030)
(0.0018)
(0.0026)
-0.0002*
(0.0001)
54.20
28,111
40,685
40,685
[0.4518]
-0.0068
-0.0023
-0.0067
(0.0039)
(0.0025)
(0.0037)
0.0001
(0.0001)
54.07
13,605
20,263
20,263
[0.7546]
-0.0153*** -0.0102*** -0.0184***
(0.0035)
(0.0017)
(0.0024)
0.0004***
(0.0001)
54.20
28,111
40,685
40,685
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Notes: Sample includes all graduates of Kentucky public high schools who enrolled into
an in-state postsecondary institution and sought an associate’s (Group A), or bachelor’s
(Group B) degree. Success is defined as completing a degree at the institution initially
chosen. Persistence excludes those who transferred. A one-unit change for quadratic
models is 10 miles. The unit change for log models is one percent. For example, Column
2 indicates a one-percent increase in distance decreases the likelihood of four-year
success by 0.007 percentage point. The sample mean for each outcome and group is
displayed in italicized brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the high schoolinstitution pair level.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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3-percentage point (14 percent) lower probability of completing a degree at that
institution within four years.
Among those seeking a bachelor’s degree, both quadratic and log models of
distance are statistically significant, though the quadratic model in Column 3 has slightly
higher explanatory power. Furthermore, theory suggests the effect of distance is not
monotonically positive as Column 4 indicates. At the average distance of 54 miles among
students seeking a bachelor’s degree, an increase of 10 miles raises the probability of
completing a degree at the initially chosen institution within four years by 0.4 points (1.5
percent). Due to the significant negative quadratic, the effect of distance becomes
negative at approximately 160 miles.
The top panel of Figure 5.4 plots the predicted probabilities of four-year success
among those in Group B as a function of distance holding other covariates constant at the
mean. The point estimates display a quadratic effect, rising until 150 miles and slightly
lower at 250 miles. However, the estimates are imprecise at these more extreme
distances, making the negative effect of distance inconclusive. The bottom panel
contrasts the point estimates between the 50-mile increments in Panel A. The contrasts
for 200 and 250 miles are statistically insignificant. Therefore, while the effect of
distance on four-year success is nonlinear, it cannot be concluded with sufficient
statistical confidence that the likelihood of success eventually declines.
The bottom-third of estimates in table 4.4 represent the effect of distance on
persistence to the second year at the same institution. There is no evidence that distance
has a quadratic effect on persistence among those seeking an associate’s degree. As
theory predicts, the effect is strictly negative. The models in Columns 1 and 2 are
virtually equivalent in explanatory power, and so the linear estimate is used to interpret
results. According to Column 1, an increase of 10 miles decreases the probability that a
student seeking an associate’s persists at the same institution by 1.3 percentage points (2
percent). Furthermore, a student seeking an associate’s degree at a particular institution
who travels one standard deviation greater distance has a 3.2 percentage point (5.4
percent) lower probability of persistence.
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Figure 5.4 - Marginal Effects of Distance on Four-year Success, Bachelors
Panel A

Panel B

Notes: Figures illustrate the effects of distance estimated in Table 4, Column 3.
Panel A provides predicted probabilities of four-year success at various distances
holding covariates constant at their mean. Panel B contrasts the point estimates in
Panel A, showing the marginal effect and significance at each distance.
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According to the preferred model in Column 3 migrating 10 miles in addition to
the average 54 miles decreases the probability of persistence among students seeking a
bachelor’s degree at the same institution by 0.6 points (0.8 percent). The effect of
distance on two-year persistence becomes positive at approximately 130 miles. Figure
5.5 displays the predicted probabilities of persistence by distance migrated in the top
panel along with contrasts in the bottom panel. Unlike four-year success, there is
significant evidence that distance has a quadratic effect on persistence. At 50 and 100
miles, distance lowers persistence among students at the same institution seeking a
bachelor’s. At 200 and 250 miles, distance increases persistence.
The probability that a student transferred in the second year and the difference in
distance between transferred institutions were estimated using the quadratic model. Table
5.5 reports the results separately between Groups A and B. Column 1 indicates at the
mean distance of 24 miles, an additional 10 miles increases the likelihood of transfer by
1.4 percentage points (18 percent) among those seeking an associate’s degree. As before,
there is no evidence of a quadratic effect among this group. For those seeking a
bachelor’s degree in Column 2, an additional 10 miles at the mean distance increases the
probability of transfer by 1 point (7 percent), and there is significant evidence of a
negative quadratic effect.
Among those students who transferred in their second year, does the distance they
initially migrate affect whether they transfer to a more proximate or distance institution?
The bottom half of table 5.5 reports estimates for this question. For Group A students
who attended the same institution and transferred in their second year, migrating 10 miles
farther than average decreased the distance to the transferred school by 12 miles. For
Group B, students transferred 10 miles more proximate to their high school. In other
words, short-to-intermediate distances increase the probability that students transfer in
their second year, and those students are more likely to transfer closer to home. 39

39

The point estimates should be interpreted with caution because part of the effect is likely mechanical.
Since only in-state students are observed, the farther a student migrates, there are necessarily fewer options
that are more distant.
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Figure 5.5 - Marginal Effects of Distance on Persistence, Bachelors
Panel A

Panel B

Notes: Figures illustrate the effects of distance estimated in Table 4, Column 3.
Panel A provides predicted probabilities of persistence at various distances
holding covariates constant at their mean. Panel B contrasts the point estimates in
Panel A, showing the marginal effect and significance at each distance.
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Table 5.5 - Effect of Distance on Transfers

Transferred
Distance (10 miles)
Distance2
Mean Distance
Students
Distance Transferred
Distance (10 miles)
Distance2
Mean Distance
Students
Student Controls
Institution FE
Year FE

Group A
Quadratic
(1)
[0.1114]
0.0196***
(0.0029)
-0.0005*
(0.0002)
18,854
[12.15]
-14.6309***
(1.2372)
0.3167***
(0.0903)
35.61
2,055
Y
Y
Y

Group B
Quadratic
(2)
[0.1400]
0.0165***
(0.0012)
-0.0006***
(0.0001)
35,699
[-35.17]
-11.4999***
(0.5513)
0.0966***
(0.0289)
64.80
4,792
Y
Y
Y

Sample for transferred includes all graduates of Kentucky public
high schools who enrolled into an in-state postsecondary
institution and sought an associate’s (Group A), or bachelor’s
(Group B) degree. Transferred is defined as attending a
different institution in the second year. Sample for distance
transferred includes only those who did transfer in their second
year. Distance transferred is calculated as distance to secondyear school minus the distance to the initially chosen school.
The sample mean for each outcome and group is displayed in
italicized brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the high
school-institution pair level.
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001

DUAL-LAMBDA SELECTION CORRECTION RESULTS
Results of the first-stage analysis indicate that both the unemployment rate and the
percent of adult-age population with a bachelor’s degree or higher at the county level are
significant predictors of which degree a student pursues. Also, for each degree group, the
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constructed pull variable is a significant predictor of which institution a student attends.40
Table 5.6 reports the estimated effect of distance on four- and six-year success as well as
persistence for Groups A and B. Also included are the estimates for group and institution
selection corrections. 41 The estimates for Group A are substantially different under this
specification compared to the base model. Among those seeking an associate’s degree, a
10-mile increase in distance decreases the probability of four-year success by 1
percentage point, six-year success by 1.6 percentage points, and persistence by 1.7
percentage points. There is a small, positive quadratic effect on persistence, but as was
the case in Figure 3, the linear prediction is imprecise at extreme distances. Therefore, it
cannot be concluded that the probability to persist actually becomes positive at 170 miles
and greater.
The only outcome for which there is significant evidence of bias among Group A
is persistence. Based on the group selection estimate, those who choose to pursue an
associate’s are less likely to persist than if a random draw of college matriculates were
assigned to pursue an associate’s. Based on the institution selection estimate, conditional
on choosing to pursue an associate’s, there is evidence of positive selectivity, meaning
there are institutions in the group for which the students choosing them are more likely to
persist than a random draw of those seeking an associate’s degree. A separate estimation
on the subsample of community colleges revealed that students seeking an associate’s
and choose to attend a community college are more likely to persist than a random draw
of students seeking an associate’s degree. There is no such evidence for students in
Group A who attend four-year universities.
For those seeking a bachelor’s degree in Column 2, the estimates are fairly similar
for four-year success, though the quadratic term is no longer significant. Notably, the sixyear success estimates are significant when correcting for selection bias. The effect of

40

See Appendix for first-stage results.
For brevity, results for each institution conditional on each degree, which would include 32 separate
estimations, are not reported. Instead, separate estimations are run for each type of degree as was done in
the previous section but pooled across institutions. This enables a more direct comparison between the two
specifications. Interpretation of the group selection correction term is straightforward, indicating whether
those who choose a particular type of degree are more or less likely to achieve the outcome than a random
draw of the population. However, the institution selection correction term is not a direct comparison
between those who choose an institution conditional on type of degree and a random draw of the
population, but rather a group-wide average of institution selection bias.

41
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Table 5.6 - Effect of Distance on Success with Selection Correction

Four-year Success
Distance (10 miles)
Distance2
Group Selection
Inst. Selection
Students
Six-Year Success
Distance (10 miles)
Distance2
Group Selection
Inst. Selection
Students
Persistence
Distance (10 miles)
Distance2
Group Selection
Inst. Selection
Students
Student Controls
Institution FE
Year FE

Group A
(1)

Group B
(2)

-0.0101**
(0.0036)
0.0004
(0.0002)
0.1874
(0.1215)
-0.1102
(0.1422)
28,111

0.0053*
(0.0024)
-0.0002
(0.0001)
-0.1724***
(0.0283)
0.2596***
(0.0396)
40,685

-0.0163**
(0.0052)
0.0005
(0.0003)
0.3021
(0.1751)
-0.1368
(0.1843)
13,605

-0.0138***
(0.0031)
0.0005***
(0.0001)
-0.1746***
(0.0407)
0.0415
(0.0603)
20,263

-0.0173***
(0.0049)
0.0005*
(0.0003)
0.6342***
(0.1452)
-0.6523***
(0.1526)
28,111
Y
Y
Y

-0.0175***
(0.0019)
0.0006***
(0.0001)
-0.1011***
(0.0207)
0.0093
(0.0276)
40,685
Y
Y
Y

Notes: Sample is the same as in Table 4. Bootstrapped
standard errors in parentheses are clustered by high schoolinstitution dyad.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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distance is in the opposite direction compared to four-year success, as was the case with
persistence in the base specification as well as this specification. A student who travels an
additional 10 miles than the average is less likely to succeed within six years by almost 1
percentage point. Similarly, traveling 10 miles greater than average lowers persistence by
slightly over 1 percentage point. Across all outcomes in Table 6 for Group B, there is
significant evidence of group selection bias. Those who choose to pursue a bachelor’s
degree are more likely to succeed within four and six years, as well as persist, than the
population of college matriculates. The only evidence of institution selection bias pertains
to four-year success. This means there are institutions in the group (i.e. four-year
universities) for which the students choosing them are significantly less likely to succeed
within four years than a random draw of those seeking a bachelor’s degree.
The top panel of Figure 5.6 plots the predicted probabilities of six-year success
among those in Group B as a function of distance holding other covariates constant at the
mean. The point estimates display a quadratic effect, decreasing until 150 miles and then
increasing at 200 and 250 miles. The bottom panel contrasts the point estimates between
the 50-mile increments in Panel A. The contrasts 50 and 100 miles indicate that the
marginal effect of distance is significantly negative. At 150 and 200 miles, the marginal
effect is not statistically different than zero. However, at 250 miles the marginal effect of
distance is significant and positive. Therefore, it can be concluded with sufficient
statistical confidence that the likelihood of six-year success eventually increases as a
function of distance.
Lastly, Table 5.7 reports the effects of distance on transfers correcting for
selection bias and are similar to those reported in Table 5. Those in Group A who travel
greater distances are more likely to transfer their second year and attend a more
proximate institution. Those in Group B who travel greater distances are also more likely
to transfer until 130 miles, at which point the probability of transferring begins to
decrease. Among those who do transfer, greater distance to the initially chosen school
results in transferring to a more proximate school. Once again, there is only evidence of
selection bias among those in Group B relative to transfers.
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Figure 5.6 - Marginal Effects of Distance on Six-year Success, Bachelors
Panel A

Panel B

Notes: Figures illustrate the effects of distance estimated in Table 6, Column 2.
Panel A provides predicted probabilities of 4-year success at various distances
holding covariates constant at their mean. Panel B contrasts the point estimates in
Panel A, showing the marginal effect and significance at each distance.
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Table 5.7 - Effect of Distance on Transfers with Selection Correction

Transferred
Distance (10 miles)
Distance2
Group Selection
Inst. Selection
Students
Distance Transferred
Distance (10 miles)
Distance2
Group Selection
Inst. Selection
Students

Group A
(1)

Group B
(2)

0.0173***
(0.0036)
-0.0004
(0.0002)
0.0196
(0.1449)
0.0229
(0.1608)
18,855

0.0156***
(0.0014)
-0.0006***
(0.0001)
0.0542**
(0.0187)
-0.1124***
(0.0267)
35,699

-14.3529***
(1.6255)
0.3115***
(0.0813)
29.7594
(37.7131)
-39.6310
(43.7760)
2,055

-9.7714***
(0.8113)
0.0474
(0.0332)
14.9426
(12.2438)
9.3355
(14.2132)
4,792

Student Controls
Institution FE
Year FE

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Notes: Sample is the same as Table 5. Bootstrapped
standard errors are clustered by high school-institution
dyad.
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Among the results, interpreting the effect of distance among those seeking an associate’s
degree is the most straightforward. For this group of college-going students distance
imposes a cost that lowers the likelihood they persist or complete a degree at the
institution in which they initially matriculated, especially when controlling for their
choice to pursue an associate’s degree. These findings are consistent with the theory
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outlined in the prior section. Limitations in the data do not enable us to identify the
mechanisms driving the cost, but some speculations can be made.
Given that 75 percent of those in Group A attended a college within 31 miles of
their high school, it seems reasonable to assume any effect distance may have on
marginal academic productivity does not play a significant role in the examined
outcomes. Additionally, the financial situation for most students is likely stable while in
school, and the financial costs associated with distance are presumably the same as when
considering attending a particular college. Thus, the financial cost of distance may not
play a significant role either. 42 Therefore, it may be reasonable to suggest the negative
effect of distance on students in Group A is driven primarily by the cost to time from
commuting. The fact that an additional 10 miles can reduce persistence by nearly 2
percentage points suggests commuting is a substantial factor.
The quadratic effect of distance on success among those seeking a bachelor’s
degree makes interpretation somewhat more nuanced, but overall the results for this
group are congruent with the theory as well. At distances that are representative of most
of the sample—between 90 and 95 percent—distance imposes a cost that lowers the
likelihood of persistence and completing a degree within six years and increases the
probability they transfer. Again, the effects are especially detectable when controlling for
their choice to pursue a bachelor’s degree. However, the negative effect of distance is
diminishing and for the small proportion of students who migrate relatively extreme
distances to attend their college of choice, they are just as likely to succeed as those who
migrated very little distance to attend the same college.
This positive quadratic relationship suggests distance is an input that allows
students to access higher quality institutions. On average, students who migrate great
distances have selected into an institution that provides greater utility compared to those
students who migrate moderate distances. As a result, the costs associated with distance
are offset. For those in Group A, no such relationship is evident, suggesting that quality
of institutions when pursuing an associate’s degree does not differ or sufficiently so to
ever offset the costs.

42

In a limited attempt to examine the financial cost of distance, an interaction between distance and FRPL
was included in an alternative specification. The estimate was not significant and did not change the results.
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Figures 3-5 also provide some insight into the cost of distance as it relates to time
commuting versus either cognitive or financially. The negative effect of distance is
greatest at short distances. Again, this suggests that commuting is a substantial factor of
success. Though to a lesser magnitude, the effect of distance remains negative at
distances where most students presumably relocate to live on or near campus. Of course,
relocation does not eliminate the need to commute for those who do not live on campus,
so it may still be a factor. Nevertheless, those who migrate 100 miles are 1 point less
likely to persist than those who migrate 50 miles. Relocation is likely necessary at both
distances, so something in addition to commuting is contributing to the negative effect of
distance.
The most perplexing result is the reversed relationship between distance and fouryear success among those seeking a bachelor’s degree, which is present in both the base
and selection bias correction specifications. If distance reduces two-year persistence and
completing a degree within six years, what explains distance increasing the likelihood of
completing a degree within four years? It is worth noting that only 29 percent of students
seeking a bachelor’s complete any degree within four years regardless of transferring to a
different institution. In fact, completing a degree at the same institution is only slightly
lower at 25 percent.
One explanation then is students in Group B who complete a degree at the same
institution within four years made an optimal choice. These students knew which
institution was best for them. In this case, distance is primarily an input that enables them
to attend their optimal institution. This would also explain why there is weak evidence of
a negative quadratic that is no longer significant when correcting for selection. The costs
associated with distance do not offset the benefit of attending a students’ optimal college.
As is the case with any human behavior, describing college-going is complex.
Based on a rich literature, we can be fairly certain that proximity to institutions of higher
education increases educational attainment on average. It is also clear that the
relationship between distance and attainment is at least partially attributable to the fact
that the likelihood of enrolling in college at all increases with proximity to a college. But
how might distance affect attainment after a student has decided to enroll and attend a
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particular institution? What are the implications for policy that alter the distances students
migrate to attend college?
Controlling for selection bias resulting from choosing type of degree and
institution, within-institution variation in distance has a significant effect on whether
students remain at the institution in the second year and complete a degree within six
years. For what describes a majority of college-going in the U.S.—recent graduates who
attend an in-state institution—distance has a negative effect on success at short-tointermediate distances. This effect is linear for those seeking an associate’s degree, but
for bachelor’s degree-seekers, distance enables them to access institutions of higher
quality that offset the costs associated with distance.
With policy aimed at increasing college enrollment and success, and in light of
the evidence in this study, it is worth noting that 65 percent of individuals in the U.S. live
within 51 miles of a public college and less than 20 percent live within 51 miles of a
public four-year institution (Akers & Soliz, 2015). More students living farther away will
need to attend college, or colleges will need to be placed more proximate to them. The
former is clearly more feasible. In doing so, policy needs to consider that students who
migrate greater distances to attend college may be less likely to succeed there.
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[6]
CONCLUSION
The goal of this work was to examine the policy and impacts of state higher education
subsidies across different modes of delivery in ways that contribute to existing research.
The primary means of achieving this goal was to extend the discussion surrounding state
subsidies from their effects on college access, choice, and success to their effects on
demand for the underlying goods and services provided by institutions that mediate such
outcomes. Specifically, focus was directed at the interaction between two phenomena: 1)
on average, the delivery of state subsidies has become increasingly on the basis of student
income and/or ability over the last 25 years, and 2) student demand for educational
resources and amenities differs across dimensions of ability and income. The impact of
this trend in state subsidy composition in relation to heterogeneous demand across
students has not been thoroughly examined.
Chapter 3 theoretically examined the response in student demand to changes in
state subsidy composition, focusing on the various mechanisms through which a state can
alter its provision of subsidies and the corresponding student subsets affected. The
general conclusion from this analysis is that HTHA policy drives a divergence in demand
between educational resources and amenities, especially in states with merit-based grant
programs, but crucially depends on three factors: 1) the specific program mechanisms a
state uses to increase grant funding, 2) the relative sizes of each student subset
determined by a state’s grant program eligibility criteria, and 3) the state’s array of
institutional choices with respect to educational resources and amenities from which
affected student subsets can choose. The chapter provides theoretical motivation for
several avenues of empirical research in the future, which are discussed in the chapter’s
conclusion.
Chapter 3 also has implications for normative theory and represents an initial step
toward a better understanding of optimal state subsidy composition. No matter a state’s
objective in subsidizing higher education—maximizing public benefits, tax revenue,
political party support, educational attainment—the allocation of subsidies across the
different modes of delivery is an important policy lever to achieve its objective. It seems
reasonable to assume student subsets do not contribute to a state’s objective identically,
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thus linking state subsidy composition to the various subsets affected can help inform
state policy how to more effectively and efficiently achieve its objective. Of course, such
steps cannot be taken until there is a better understanding of what institutional goods and
services should be considered an educational resource, an amenity, or some other
category that is relevant to student outcomes.
Chapter 4 empirically examined the effect the percentage of total state subsidies
allocated to grants has on institutional expenditure shares. The expectation was that
institutions will allocate resources across operational categories in ways that reflect the
divergence in demand discussed in Chapter 3. The results support this hypothesis,
primarily among less-selective public institutions, which are most sensitive to student
demand pressure. An important task for future research on this front is to strengthen
causal inference by identifying the beginning and/or end of substantial state grant
programs and analyzing their effect on institutional expenditure shares.
In addition to providing empirical support for the theory presented in Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 contributes to research concerning the effect of state financial aid on college
student outcomes, particularly completion of a degree. It is of considerable interest to
scholars and policymakers whether state subsidies impact college completion. Whether
state subsidies simultaneously affect institutional expenditure shares, which in turn
impact college completion, has not been considered previously. A more comprehensive
analysis of institutional expenditures and their impact on student outcomes is needed in
order to make recommendations concerning state subsidy composition on this basis.
Lastly, Chapter 5 is somewhat peripheral to the subject of state subsidies but
nevertheless examines an important aspect of college-going behavior that state subsidies
can alter—the distance students migrate to attend college. This chapter contributes to
existing research in three ways: 1) establishing a theoretical basis upon which to expect
distance to affect college student success after choosing to attend an institution, 2)
estimating the effect of distance on the likelihood a student completes a degree at the
institution he or she initially matriculated into, and 3) explores the dual-lambda selection
correction method as a way to account for the multiple processes involved in college
choice. The results suggest distance has a negative, linear effect on the success of those
seeking an associate’s degree, which may reflect the impact of commuting. The effect of
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distance on success among those seeking a bachelor’s degree according to the results is
more nuanced and somewhat open to interpretation. At a minimum, there is a clear
distinction between the effects of short, intermediate, and long distances on success.
Again, this is arguably due to differences between commuting and relocating to college,
which is a valuable topic for future research.
As state budgets become increasingly strained, most state governments have
restructured their financing of higher education in a way that lowers appropriations in
exchange for subsidies targeted on the basis of student income or ability. Moreover, there
is little evidence such decisions are made in a strategic manner. Though the topic of
public benefits from higher education is still debated, the fact that these subsidies exist
suggests state governments expect a return on this investment. As long as provision of
higher education remains neither fully private or public, which types of students receive
subsidies and how much they receive will continue to be critical questions for issues of
college access, choice, and success that no doubt impact states’ returns on investment.
While much public attention is paid toward levels of subsidies, this work attempted to
show that the extent to which states target subsidies on the basis of income or ability
relative to appropriations is an important part of these question.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF COLLEGE EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES
Instruction
A functional expense category that includes expenses of the colleges, schools,
departments, and other instructional divisions of the institution and expenses for
departmental research and public service that are not separately budgeted. Includes
general academic instruction, occupational and vocational instruction, community
education, preparatory and adult basic education, and regular, special, and extension
sessions. Also includes expenses for both credit and non-credit activities. Excludes
expenses for academic administration where the primary function is administration (e.g.,
academic deans). Information technology expenses related to instructional activities are
included if the institution separately budgets and expenses information technology
resources (otherwise these expenses are included in academic support).
Research
A functional expense category that includes expenses for activities specifically
organized to produce research outcomes and commissioned by an agency either external
to the institution or separately budgeted by an organizational unit within the institution.
The category includes institutes and research centers, and individual and project
research. This function does not include nonresearch sponsored programs (e.g., training
programs). Also included are information technology expenses related to research
activities if the institution separately budgets and expenses information technology
resources (otherwise these expenses are included in academic support.)
Academic support
A functional expense category that includes expenses of activities and services that
support the institution's primary missions of instruction, research, and public service. It
includes the retention, preservation, and display of educational materials (for example,
libraries, museums, and galleries); organized activities that provide support services to
the academic functions of the institution (such as a demonstration school associated with
a college of education or veterinary and dental clinics if their primary purpose is to
support the instructional program); media such as audiovisual services; academic
administration (including academic deans but not department chairpersons); and
formally organized and separately budgeted academic personnel development and
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course and curriculum development expenses. Also included are information technology
expenses related to academic support activities; if an institution does not separately
budget and expense information technology resources, the costs associated with the
three primary programs will be applied to this function and the remainder to institutional
support.
Student services
A functional expense category that includes expenses for admissions, registrar activities,
and activities whose primary purpose is to contribute to students emotional and physical
well-being and to their intellectual, cultural, and social development outside the context
of the formal instructional program. Examples include student activities, cultural events,
student newspapers, intramural athletics, student organizations, supplemental instruction
outside the normal administration, and student records. Intercollegiate athletics and
student health services may also be included except when operated as self - supporting
auxiliary enterprises. Also may include information technology expenses related to
student service activities if the institution separately budgets and expenses information
technology resources (otherwise these expenses are included in institutional support.)
Institutional support
A functional expense category that includes expenses for the day-to-day operational
support of the institution. Includes expenses for general administrative services, central
executive-level activities concerned with management and long-range planning, legal
and fiscal operations, space management, employee personnel and records, logistical
services such as purchasing and printing, and public relations and development. Also
includes information technology expenses related to institutional support activities.
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APPENDIX B: COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL EXPENDITURES
Chapter 4 examined the effect of state subsidies on institutional expenditure shares as
proportions of total educational and general expenditures. The following analysis is
aimed at checking the sensitivity of the results to compositional analysis. To do so, the
expenditure shares s for the four operational categories i of interest at each institution j—
instruction, academic support, student services, and auxiliary enterprises—were first
transformed to a composition c using the additive logarithmic transformation (alr):
𝑠𝑖𝑖

where 𝑠𝑘𝑘 = 1 − ∑𝑠𝑖𝑖 .

𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙 �𝑠 � ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘
𝑘𝑘

Analysis was repeated for equations (1) and (2) using the compositional

dependent variables. Coefficients for select variables are reported in the figures below
along with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients are exponentiated so that the
interpretation of the x-axis is the percent change in the ratio due to a 1-unit increase in the
explanatory variable. It is important to reiterate that the significant coefficients
corresponding to the interaction terms indicate a significant difference from the base
term, not a significant effect of the explanatory variable itself. A test of the linear
combination of the base term and the interaction must be conducted to determine a
significant marginal effect. Notable differences were discussed in the Sensitivity Analysis
section of Chapter 4.
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Figure A.1 – Effect of Need and Non-need by Control

Figure A.2 – Effect of Mixed and Merit by Control
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Figure A.3 – Effect of Need and Non-need by Selectivity

Figure A.4 – Effect of Mixed and Merit by Selectivity
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APPENDIX C: DERIVATION OF DUAL LAMBDAS
The following procedure was proposed by Vijverberg (1995) to derive dual lambdas that
control for selection bias when the choice is the result of two interdependent processes.
Vijverberg used dual lambda selection correction to estimate wage equations conditional
on migration and employment participation. Chapter 5 adopts this procedure to estimate
the likelihood of college student success conditional on degree choice and college choice.
Notation is adapted to be consistent with Chapter 5.
𝜆𝑗|𝑔 =
𝜆𝑔 =

2 −0.5 �𝐴𝑛 −𝜌𝐴𝑛 ��
−𝜙(𝐴𝑛
𝑔
𝑗|𝑔 Φ�(1−𝜌 )
𝑗|𝑔

𝜌𝑔𝑔

2 −0.5 �𝐴𝑛 −𝜌𝐴𝑛 ��
−𝜙(𝐴𝑛
𝑔 Φ�(1−𝜌 )
𝑔
𝑗|𝑔

𝜌𝑔𝑔

where 𝜌 is a correlation coefficient between the two selection biases

𝜌 = � Φ−1 �𝐹�𝜂𝑗|𝑔 ��Φ−1 �𝐹�𝜂𝑔 ��ℎ�𝜂𝑗|𝑔 , 𝜂𝑔 � 𝑑𝜂𝑗|𝑔 𝑑𝜂𝑔

and 𝐴𝑛 is a normal distribution transformation of the estimated probabilities that a student
chooses to pursue degree g or attends college j conditional on g
𝑛
𝐴𝑗|𝑔
= Φ−1 [𝑝𝑗|𝑔 ]

𝐴𝑔𝑛 = Φ−1 [𝑝𝑔 ]

which are also used in the calculation of 𝜌 by substitution of the 𝜂 terms.
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APPENDIX D – FIRST-STAGE DUAL LAMBDA ESTIMATES
Degree Choice
Unemployment
Bach or Higher
Distance
Distance2
Male Dummy
Black
Hispanic
Asian
FRPL
SPED
LEP
Gifted
ACT
Final GPA
AP Classes
Credits

Observations
Notes: ***p<0.001

Bachelor's
0.0740***
(0.0069)
10.6323***
(0.1799)
0.4537***
(0.0071)
-0.0139***
(0.0004)
0.2829***
(0.0220)
0.0247
(0.0395)
-0.0676
(0.0762)
0.6176***
(0.1170)
-0.2623***
(0.0229)
-0.5733***
(0.1623)
-1.2449***
(0.2553)
0.0207
(0.0261)
0.2246***
(0.0038)
1.0533***
(0.0231)
0.0826***
(0.0056)
-0.0351***
(0.0036)

Joint Test of Pull on Institutional Choice
𝝌𝟐
Associate’s
Bachelor’s
1400.24***

68797
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207.68***
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